diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'contrib/compiler-rt/lib/tsan/rtl/tsan_platform_linux.cc')
| -rw-r--r-- | contrib/compiler-rt/lib/tsan/rtl/tsan_platform_linux.cc | 117 |
1 files changed, 105 insertions, 12 deletions
diff --git a/contrib/compiler-rt/lib/tsan/rtl/tsan_platform_linux.cc b/contrib/compiler-rt/lib/tsan/rtl/tsan_platform_linux.cc index d2ce60709067..ec8606f65d5c 100644 --- a/contrib/compiler-rt/lib/tsan/rtl/tsan_platform_linux.cc +++ b/contrib/compiler-rt/lib/tsan/rtl/tsan_platform_linux.cc @@ -1,9 +1,8 @@ //===-- tsan_platform_linux.cc --------------------------------------------===// // -// The LLVM Compiler Infrastructure -// -// This file is distributed under the University of Illinois Open Source -// License. See LICENSE.TXT for details. +// Part of the LLVM Project, under the Apache License v2.0 with LLVM Exceptions. +// See https://llvm.org/LICENSE.txt for license information. +// SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 WITH LLVM-exception // //===----------------------------------------------------------------------===// // @@ -68,12 +67,25 @@ extern "C" void *__libc_stack_end; void *__libc_stack_end = 0; #endif -#if SANITIZER_LINUX && defined(__aarch64__) -void InitializeGuardPtr() __attribute__((visibility("hidden"))); +#if SANITIZER_LINUX && defined(__aarch64__) && !SANITIZER_GO +# define INIT_LONGJMP_XOR_KEY 1 +#else +# define INIT_LONGJMP_XOR_KEY 0 +#endif + +#if INIT_LONGJMP_XOR_KEY +#include "interception/interception.h" +// Must be declared outside of other namespaces. +DECLARE_REAL(int, _setjmp, void *env) #endif namespace __tsan { +#if INIT_LONGJMP_XOR_KEY +static void InitializeLongjmpXorKey(); +static uptr longjmp_xor_key; +#endif + #ifdef TSAN_RUNTIME_VMA // Runtime detected VMA size. uptr vmaSize; @@ -249,7 +261,8 @@ void InitializePlatform() { // Go maps shadow memory lazily and works fine with limited address space. // Unlimited stack is not a problem as well, because the executable // is not compiled with -pie. - if (!SANITIZER_GO) { +#if !SANITIZER_GO + { bool reexec = false; // TSan doesn't play well with unlimited stack size (as stack // overlaps with shadow memory). If we detect unlimited stack size, @@ -284,17 +297,16 @@ void InitializePlatform() { CHECK_NE(personality(old_personality | ADDR_NO_RANDOMIZE), -1); reexec = true; } - // Initialize the guard pointer used in {sig}{set,long}jump. - InitializeGuardPtr(); + // Initialize the xor key used in {sig}{set,long}jump. + InitializeLongjmpXorKey(); #endif if (reexec) ReExec(); } -#if !SANITIZER_GO CheckAndProtect(); InitTlsSize(); -#endif +#endif // !SANITIZER_GO } #if !SANITIZER_GO @@ -335,6 +347,83 @@ int ExtractRecvmsgFDs(void *msgp, int *fds, int nfd) { return res; } +// Reverse operation of libc stack pointer mangling +static uptr UnmangleLongJmpSp(uptr mangled_sp) { +#if defined(__x86_64__) +# if SANITIZER_LINUX + // Reverse of: + // xor %fs:0x30, %rsi + // rol $0x11, %rsi + uptr sp; + asm("ror $0x11, %0 \n" + "xor %%fs:0x30, %0 \n" + : "=r" (sp) + : "0" (mangled_sp)); + return sp; +# else + return mangled_sp; +# endif +#elif defined(__aarch64__) +# if SANITIZER_LINUX + return mangled_sp ^ longjmp_xor_key; +# else + return mangled_sp; +# endif +#elif defined(__powerpc64__) + // Reverse of: + // ld r4, -28696(r13) + // xor r4, r3, r4 + uptr xor_key; + asm("ld %0, -28696(%%r13)" : "=r" (xor_key)); + return mangled_sp ^ xor_key; +#elif defined(__mips__) + return mangled_sp; +#else + #error "Unknown platform" +#endif +} + +#ifdef __powerpc__ +# define LONG_JMP_SP_ENV_SLOT 0 +#elif SANITIZER_FREEBSD +# define LONG_JMP_SP_ENV_SLOT 2 +#elif SANITIZER_NETBSD +# define LONG_JMP_SP_ENV_SLOT 6 +#elif SANITIZER_LINUX +# ifdef __aarch64__ +# define LONG_JMP_SP_ENV_SLOT 13 +# elif defined(__mips64) +# define LONG_JMP_SP_ENV_SLOT 1 +# else +# define LONG_JMP_SP_ENV_SLOT 6 +# endif +#endif + +uptr ExtractLongJmpSp(uptr *env) { + uptr mangled_sp = env[LONG_JMP_SP_ENV_SLOT]; + return UnmangleLongJmpSp(mangled_sp); +} + +#if INIT_LONGJMP_XOR_KEY +// GLIBC mangles the function pointers in jmp_buf (used in {set,long}*jmp +// functions) by XORing them with a random key. For AArch64 it is a global +// variable rather than a TCB one (as for x86_64/powerpc). We obtain the key by +// issuing a setjmp and XORing the SP pointer values to derive the key. +static void InitializeLongjmpXorKey() { + // 1. Call REAL(setjmp), which stores the mangled SP in env. + jmp_buf env; + REAL(_setjmp)(env); + + // 2. Retrieve vanilla/mangled SP. + uptr sp; + asm("mov %0, sp" : "=r" (sp)); + uptr mangled_sp = ((uptr *)&env)[LONG_JMP_SP_ENV_SLOT]; + + // 3. xor SPs to obtain key. + longjmp_xor_key = mangled_sp ^ sp; +} +#endif + void ImitateTlsWrite(ThreadState *thr, uptr tls_addr, uptr tls_size) { // Check that the thr object is in tls; const uptr thr_beg = (uptr)thr; @@ -362,7 +451,7 @@ int call_pthread_cancel_with_cleanup(int(*fn)(void *c, void *m, pthread_cleanup_pop(0); return res; } -#endif +#endif // !SANITIZER_GO #if !SANITIZER_GO void ReplaceSystemMalloc() { } @@ -402,6 +491,10 @@ ThreadState *cur_thread() { return thr; } +void set_cur_thread(ThreadState *thr) { + *get_android_tls_ptr() = reinterpret_cast<uptr>(thr); +} + void cur_thread_finalize() { __sanitizer_sigset_t emptyset; internal_sigfillset(&emptyset); |