diff options
author | Kyle Evans <kevans@FreeBSD.org> | 2024-07-15 20:17:47 +0000 |
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committer | Kyle Evans <kevans@FreeBSD.org> | 2024-07-15 20:17:47 +0000 |
commit | 5862c891bb7c588aa00538d85eb26ffe77d3f709 (patch) | |
tree | 12e9d353093efe661363a5142a47e31501d9fc19 /sys | |
parent | 9cc06bf7aa2846c35483de567779bb8afc289f53 (diff) |
kern: zero out stack buffer after copying out random bits
The kern.arandom sysctl handler uses an intermediate buffer on the stack
to hold random data that it subsequently copies out to the sysctl
request. Err on the side of caution and zero out the stack buffer after
we're done with it to avoid a potential entropy leak later on.
Reviewed by: cem, emaste, markj
MFC after: 3 days
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D45978
Diffstat (limited to 'sys')
-rw-r--r-- | sys/kern/kern_mib.c | 6 |
1 files changed, 5 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/sys/kern/kern_mib.c b/sys/kern/kern_mib.c index 5724ed3f6932..fe6e49865682 100644 --- a/sys/kern/kern_mib.c +++ b/sys/kern/kern_mib.c @@ -182,10 +182,14 @@ sysctl_kern_arnd(SYSCTL_HANDLER_ARGS) { char buf[256]; size_t len; + int error; len = MIN(req->oldlen, sizeof(buf)); read_random(buf, len); - return (SYSCTL_OUT(req, buf, len)); + + error = SYSCTL_OUT(req, buf, len); + explicit_bzero(buf, len); + return (error); } SYSCTL_PROC(_kern, KERN_ARND, arandom, |