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authorBrian Feldman <green@FreeBSD.org>2001-03-20 02:06:40 +0000
committerBrian Feldman <green@FreeBSD.org>2001-03-20 02:06:40 +0000
commite0fbb1d2de5da5201d80ec05cf2aee2d90e3f1b0 (patch)
tree6ee0582fe55db50a4ce6527a96062f3c29acdc40 /crypto/openssh/sshconnect1.c
parent4c96ae1554c33568dd598ae3f672dbae156ae237 (diff)
downloadsrc-e0fbb1d2de5da5201d80ec05cf2aee2d90e3f1b0.tar.gz
src-e0fbb1d2de5da5201d80ec05cf2aee2d90e3f1b0.zip
Make password attacks based on traffic analysis harder by requiring that
"non-echoed" characters are still echoed back in a null packet, as well as pad passwords sent to not give hints to the length otherwise. Obtained from: OpenBSD
Notes
Notes: svn path=/head/; revision=74500
Diffstat (limited to 'crypto/openssh/sshconnect1.c')
-rw-r--r--crypto/openssh/sshconnect1.c4
1 files changed, 2 insertions, 2 deletions
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/sshconnect1.c b/crypto/openssh/sshconnect1.c
index 4d7351ba58eb..2b2d5fc9dc57 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/sshconnect1.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/sshconnect1.c
@@ -640,7 +640,7 @@ try_skey_authentication()
error("Permission denied, please try again.");
response = read_passphrase("Response: ", 0);
packet_start(SSH_CMSG_AUTH_TIS_RESPONSE);
- packet_put_string(response, strlen(response));
+ ssh_put_password(response);
memset(response, 0, strlen(response));
xfree(response);
packet_send();
@@ -673,7 +673,7 @@ try_password_authentication(char *prompt)
error("Permission denied, please try again.");
password = read_passphrase(prompt, 0);
packet_start(SSH_CMSG_AUTH_PASSWORD);
- packet_put_string(password, strlen(password));
+ ssh_put_password(password);
memset(password, 0, strlen(password));
xfree(password);
packet_send();