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authorMark Johnston <markj@FreeBSD.org>2022-10-25 17:57:44 +0000
committerMark Johnston <markj@FreeBSD.org>2023-03-30 14:45:00 +0000
commitcab1056105e3fdadf6f2b8cc745cfecfb0411755 (patch)
treeba329fff250058bd1d4b536d64966911c387b01a
parent45e405603b7f4d33372f32c80453ab5cd0d8fdcf (diff)
downloadsrc-cab1056105e3fdadf6f2b8cc745cfecfb0411755.tar.gz
src-cab1056105e3fdadf6f2b8cc745cfecfb0411755.zip
kdb: Modify securelevel policy
Currently, sysctls which enable KDB in some way are flagged with CTLFLAG_SECURE, meaning that you can't modify them if securelevel > 0. This is so that KDB cannot be used to lower a running system's securelevel, see commit 3d7618d8bf0b7. However, the newer mac_ddb(4) restricts DDB operations which could be abused to lower securelevel while retaining some ability to gather useful debugging information. To enable the use of KDB (specifically, DDB) on systems with a raised securelevel, change the KDB sysctl policy: rather than relying on CTLFLAG_SECURE, add a check of the current securelevel to kdb_trap(). If the securelevel is raised, only pass control to the backend if MAC specifically grants access; otherwise simply check to see if mac_ddb vetoes the request, as before. Add a new secure sysctl, debug.kdb.enter_securelevel, to override this behaviour. That is, the sysctl lets one enter a KDB backend even with a raised securelevel, so long as it is set before the securelevel is raised. Reviewed by: mhorne, stevek MFC after: 1 month Sponsored by: Juniper Networks Sponsored by: Klara, Inc. Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D37122
-rw-r--r--share/man/man7/security.77
-rw-r--r--sys/kern/kern_shutdown.c12
-rw-r--r--sys/kern/subr_kdb.c46
-rw-r--r--sys/security/mac/mac_framework.h1
-rw-r--r--sys/security/mac/mac_kdb.c9
5 files changed, 59 insertions, 16 deletions
diff --git a/share/man/man7/security.7 b/share/man/man7/security.7
index f87833ece112..e3f11765d083 100644
--- a/share/man/man7/security.7
+++ b/share/man/man7/security.7
@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@
.\"
.\" $FreeBSD$
.\"
-.Dd September 29, 2022
+.Dd March 30, 2023
.Dt SECURITY 7
.Os
.Sh NAME
@@ -537,7 +537,10 @@ kernel modules (see
may not be loaded or unloaded.
The kernel debugger may not be entered using the
.Va debug.kdb.enter
-sysctl.
+sysctl unless a
+.Xr MAC 9
+policy grants access, for example using
+.Xr mac_ddb 4 .
A panic or trap cannot be forced using the
.Va debug.kdb.panic ,
.Va debug.kdb.panic_str
diff --git a/sys/kern/kern_shutdown.c b/sys/kern/kern_shutdown.c
index 70de6b691fd3..4544e217802d 100644
--- a/sys/kern/kern_shutdown.c
+++ b/sys/kern/kern_shutdown.c
@@ -129,18 +129,18 @@ int debugger_on_panic = 0;
int debugger_on_panic = 1;
#endif
SYSCTL_INT(_debug, OID_AUTO, debugger_on_panic,
- CTLFLAG_RWTUN | CTLFLAG_SECURE,
- &debugger_on_panic, 0, "Run debugger on kernel panic");
+ CTLFLAG_RWTUN, &debugger_on_panic, 0,
+ "Run debugger on kernel panic");
static bool debugger_on_recursive_panic = false;
SYSCTL_BOOL(_debug, OID_AUTO, debugger_on_recursive_panic,
- CTLFLAG_RWTUN | CTLFLAG_SECURE,
- &debugger_on_recursive_panic, 0, "Run debugger on recursive kernel panic");
+ CTLFLAG_RWTUN, &debugger_on_recursive_panic, 0,
+ "Run debugger on recursive kernel panic");
int debugger_on_trap = 0;
SYSCTL_INT(_debug, OID_AUTO, debugger_on_trap,
- CTLFLAG_RWTUN | CTLFLAG_SECURE,
- &debugger_on_trap, 0, "Run debugger on kernel trap before panic");
+ CTLFLAG_RWTUN, &debugger_on_trap, 0,
+ "Run debugger on kernel trap before panic");
#ifdef KDB_TRACE
static int trace_on_panic = 1;
diff --git a/sys/kern/subr_kdb.c b/sys/kern/subr_kdb.c
index b1bf197be3dc..ff981cdfe47c 100644
--- a/sys/kern/subr_kdb.c
+++ b/sys/kern/subr_kdb.c
@@ -77,6 +77,7 @@ struct trapframe *kdb_frame = NULL;
static int kdb_break_to_debugger = KDB_BREAK_TO_DEBUGGER;
static int kdb_alt_break_to_debugger = KDB_ALT_BREAK_TO_DEBUGGER;
+static int kdb_enter_securelevel = 0;
KDB_BACKEND(null, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL);
@@ -103,7 +104,7 @@ SYSCTL_PROC(_debug_kdb, OID_AUTO, current,
"currently selected KDB backend");
SYSCTL_PROC(_debug_kdb, OID_AUTO, enter,
- CTLTYPE_INT | CTLFLAG_RW | CTLFLAG_SECURE | CTLFLAG_MPSAFE, NULL, 0,
+ CTLTYPE_INT | CTLFLAG_RW | CTLFLAG_MPSAFE, NULL, 0,
kdb_sysctl_enter, "I",
"set to enter the debugger");
@@ -133,13 +134,18 @@ SYSCTL_PROC(_debug_kdb, OID_AUTO, stack_overflow,
"set to cause a stack overflow");
SYSCTL_INT(_debug_kdb, OID_AUTO, break_to_debugger,
- CTLFLAG_RWTUN | CTLFLAG_SECURE,
+ CTLFLAG_RWTUN,
&kdb_break_to_debugger, 0, "Enable break to debugger");
SYSCTL_INT(_debug_kdb, OID_AUTO, alt_break_to_debugger,
- CTLFLAG_RWTUN | CTLFLAG_SECURE,
+ CTLFLAG_RWTUN,
&kdb_alt_break_to_debugger, 0, "Enable alternative break to debugger");
+SYSCTL_INT(_debug_kdb, OID_AUTO, enter_securelevel,
+ CTLFLAG_RWTUN | CTLFLAG_SECURE,
+ &kdb_enter_securelevel, 0,
+ "Maximum securelevel to enter a KDB backend");
+
/*
* Flag to indicate to debuggers why the debugger was entered.
*/
@@ -489,6 +495,34 @@ kdb_dbbe_select(const char *name)
return (EINVAL);
}
+static bool
+kdb_backend_permitted(struct kdb_dbbe *be, struct ucred *cred)
+{
+ int error;
+
+ error = securelevel_gt(cred, kdb_enter_securelevel);
+#ifdef MAC
+ /*
+ * Give MAC a chance to weigh in on the policy: if the securelevel is
+ * not raised, then MAC may veto the backend, otherwise MAC may
+ * explicitly grant access.
+ */
+ if (error == 0) {
+ error = mac_kdb_check_backend(be);
+ if (error != 0) {
+ printf("MAC prevented execution of KDB backend: %s\n",
+ be->dbbe_name);
+ return (false);
+ }
+ } else if (mac_kdb_grant_backend(be) == 0) {
+ error = 0;
+ }
+#endif
+ if (error != 0)
+ printf("refusing to enter KDB with elevated securelevel\n");
+ return (error == 0);
+}
+
/*
* Enter the currently selected debugger. If a message has been provided,
* it is printed first. If the debugger does not support the enter method,
@@ -733,15 +767,11 @@ kdb_trap(int type, int code, struct trapframe *tf)
cngrab();
for (;;) {
-#ifdef MAC
- if (mac_kdb_check_backend(be) != 0) {
- printf("MAC prevented execution of KDB backend: %s\n",
- be->dbbe_name);
+ if (!kdb_backend_permitted(be, curthread->td_ucred)) {
/* Unhandled breakpoint traps are fatal. */
handled = 1;
break;
}
-#endif
handled = be->dbbe_trap(type, code);
if (be == kdb_dbbe)
break;
diff --git a/sys/security/mac/mac_framework.h b/sys/security/mac/mac_framework.h
index 31951c97a69e..8a1de6fe13e1 100644
--- a/sys/security/mac/mac_framework.h
+++ b/sys/security/mac/mac_framework.h
@@ -214,6 +214,7 @@ void mac_ipq_reassemble(struct ipq *q, struct mbuf *m);
void mac_ipq_update(struct mbuf *m, struct ipq *q);
int mac_kdb_check_backend(struct kdb_dbbe *be);
+int mac_kdb_grant_backend(struct kdb_dbbe *be);
int mac_kenv_check_dump(struct ucred *cred);
int mac_kenv_check_get(struct ucred *cred, char *name);
diff --git a/sys/security/mac/mac_kdb.c b/sys/security/mac/mac_kdb.c
index 9082ec7d4580..08bb3eb743f1 100644
--- a/sys/security/mac/mac_kdb.c
+++ b/sys/security/mac/mac_kdb.c
@@ -40,6 +40,15 @@
#include <security/mac/mac_policy.h>
int
+mac_kdb_grant_backend(struct kdb_dbbe *be)
+{
+ int error = 0;
+
+ MAC_POLICY_GRANT_NOSLEEP(kdb_check_backend, be);
+ return (error);
+}
+
+int
mac_kdb_check_backend(struct kdb_dbbe *be)
{
int error = 0;