aboutsummaryrefslogtreecommitdiff
diff options
context:
space:
mode:
authorJonathan T. Looney <jtl@FreeBSD.org>2018-08-14 17:32:07 +0000
committerJonathan T. Looney <jtl@FreeBSD.org>2018-08-14 17:32:07 +0000
commit2ceeacbe711f3719cf7b95296627fa766956503e (patch)
tree31fe1213a3b6d6234f58e07ae7fc295e32ee23b9
parenta967df1c8ff457891d85a5c6ca6f9c3c861a85eb (diff)
downloadsrc-2ceeacbe711f3719cf7b95296627fa766956503e.tar.gz
src-2ceeacbe711f3719cf7b95296627fa766956503e.zip
Lower the default limits on the IPv6 reassembly queue.
Currently, the limits are quite high. On machines with millions of mbuf clusters, the reassembly queue limits can also run into the millions. Lower these values. Also, try to ensure that no bucket will have a reassembly queue larger than approximately 100 items. This limits the cost to find the correct reassembly queue when processing an incoming fragment. Due to the low limits on each bucket's length, increase the size of the hash table from 64 to 1024. Reviewed by: jhb Security: FreeBSD-SA-18:10.ip Security: CVE-2018-6923
Notes
Notes: svn path=/head/; revision=337787
-rw-r--r--sys/netinet6/frag6.c26
1 files changed, 21 insertions, 5 deletions
diff --git a/sys/netinet6/frag6.c b/sys/netinet6/frag6.c
index 674be961ba56..0f30801540a6 100644
--- a/sys/netinet6/frag6.c
+++ b/sys/netinet6/frag6.c
@@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ __FBSDID("$FreeBSD$");
/*
* Reassembly headers are stored in hash buckets.
*/
-#define IP6REASS_NHASH_LOG2 6
+#define IP6REASS_NHASH_LOG2 10
#define IP6REASS_NHASH (1 << IP6REASS_NHASH_LOG2)
#define IP6REASS_HMASK (IP6REASS_NHASH - 1)
@@ -107,6 +107,22 @@ VNET_DEFINE_STATIC(uint32_t, ip6q_hashseed);
static MALLOC_DEFINE(M_FTABLE, "fragment", "fragment reassembly header");
/*
+ * By default, limit the number of IP6 fragments across all reassembly
+ * queues to 1/32 of the total number of mbuf clusters.
+ *
+ * Limit the total number of reassembly queues per VNET to the
+ * IP6 fragment limit, but ensure the limit will not allow any bucket
+ * to grow above 100 items. (The bucket limit is
+ * IP_MAXFRAGPACKETS / (IPREASS_NHASH / 2), so the 50 is the correct
+ * multiplier to reach a 100-item limit.)
+ * The 100-item limit was chosen as brief testing seems to show that
+ * this produces "reasonable" performance on some subset of systems
+ * under DoS attack.
+ */
+#define IP6_MAXFRAGS (nmbclusters / 32)
+#define IP6_MAXFRAGPACKETS (imin(IP6_MAXFRAGS, IP6REASS_NHASH * 50))
+
+/*
* Initialise reassembly queue and fragment identifier.
*/
void
@@ -123,11 +139,11 @@ frag6_change(void *tag)
{
VNET_ITERATOR_DECL(vnet_iter);
- ip6_maxfrags = nmbclusters / 4;
+ ip6_maxfrags = IP6_MAXFRAGS;
VNET_LIST_RLOCK_NOSLEEP();
VNET_FOREACH(vnet_iter) {
CURVNET_SET(vnet_iter);
- V_ip6_maxfragpackets = nmbclusters / 4;
+ V_ip6_maxfragpackets = IP6_MAXFRAGPACKETS;
frag6_set_bucketsize();
CURVNET_RESTORE();
}
@@ -140,7 +156,7 @@ frag6_init(void)
struct ip6q *q6;
int i;
- V_ip6_maxfragpackets = nmbclusters / 4;
+ V_ip6_maxfragpackets = IP6_MAXFRAGPACKETS;
frag6_set_bucketsize();
for (i = 0; i < IP6REASS_NHASH; i++) {
q6 = IP6Q_HEAD(i);
@@ -153,7 +169,7 @@ frag6_init(void)
if (!IS_DEFAULT_VNET(curvnet))
return;
- ip6_maxfrags = nmbclusters / 4;
+ ip6_maxfrags = IP6_MAXFRAGS;
EVENTHANDLER_REGISTER(nmbclusters_change,
frag6_change, NULL, EVENTHANDLER_PRI_ANY);
}