1 files changed, 53 insertions, 7 deletions

diff --git a/sys/net80211/ieee80211_sta.c b/sys/net80211/ieee80211_sta.c
index 04fafe9c9772..dd9ef6e4d21a 100644
--- a/sys/net80211/ieee80211_sta.c
+++ b/sys/net80211/ieee80211_sta.c
@@ -546,6 +546,16 @@ sta_input(struct ieee80211_node *ni, struct mbuf *m,
 	int hdrspace, need_tap = 1;	/* mbuf need to be tapped. */
 	uint8_t dir, type, subtype, qos;
 	uint8_t *bssid;
+	int is_hw_decrypted = 0;
+	int has_decrypted = 0;
+
+	/*
+	 * Some devices do hardware decryption all the way through
+	 * to pretending the frame wasn't encrypted in the first place.
+	 * So, tag it appropriately so it isn't discarded inappropriately.
+	 */
+	if ((rxs != NULL) && (rxs->c_pktflags & IEEE80211_RX_F_DECRYPTED))
+		is_hw_decrypted = 1;
 
 	if (m->m_flags & M_AMPDU_MPDU) {
 		/*
@@ -724,6 +734,21 @@ sta_input(struct ieee80211_node *ni, struct mbuf *m,
 		}
 
 		/*
+		 * Handle privacy requirements for hardware decryption
+		 * devices.
+		 *
+		 * For those devices, a handful of things happen.
+		 *
+		 * + If IV has been stripped, then we can't run
+		 *   ieee80211_crypto_decap() - none of the key
+		 * + If MIC has been stripped, we can't validate
+		 *   MIC here.
+		 * + If MIC fails, then we need to communicate a
+		 *   MIC failure up to the stack - but we don't know
+		 *   which key was used.
+		 */
+
+		/*
 		 * Handle privacy requirements.  Note that we
 		 * must not be preempted from here until after
 		 * we (potentially) call ieee80211_crypto_demic;
@@ -731,7 +756,7 @@ sta_input(struct ieee80211_node *ni, struct mbuf *m,
 		 * crypto cipher modules used to do delayed update
 		 * of replay sequence numbers.
 		 */
-		if (wh->i_fc[1] & IEEE80211_FC1_PROTECTED) {
+		if (is_hw_decrypted || wh->i_fc[1] & IEEE80211_FC1_PROTECTED) {
 			if ((vap->iv_flags & IEEE80211_F_PRIVACY) == 0) {
 				/*
 				 * Discard encrypted frames when privacy is off.
@@ -742,14 +767,14 @@ sta_input(struct ieee80211_node *ni, struct mbuf *m,
 				IEEE80211_NODE_STAT(ni, rx_noprivacy);
 				goto out;
 			}
-			key = ieee80211_crypto_decap(ni, m, hdrspace);
-			if (key == NULL) {
+			if (ieee80211_crypto_decap(ni, m, hdrspace, &key) == 0) {
 				/* NB: stats+msgs handled in crypto_decap */
 				IEEE80211_NODE_STAT(ni, rx_wepfail);
 				goto out;
 			}
 			wh = mtod(m, struct ieee80211_frame *);
 			wh->i_fc[1] &= ~IEEE80211_FC1_PROTECTED;
+			has_decrypted = 1;
 		} else {
 			/* XXX M_WEP and IEEE80211_F_PRIVACY */
 			key = NULL;
@@ -779,8 +804,13 @@ sta_input(struct ieee80211_node *ni, struct mbuf *m,
 
 		/*
 		 * Next strip any MSDU crypto bits.
+		 *
+		 * Note: we can't do MIC stripping/verification if the
+		 * upper layer has stripped it.  We have to check MIC
+		 * ourselves.  So, key may be NULL, but we have to check
+		 * the RX status.
 		 */
-		if (key != NULL && !ieee80211_crypto_demic(vap, key, m, 0)) {
+		if (!ieee80211_crypto_demic(vap, key, m, 0)) {
 			IEEE80211_DISCARD_MAC(vap, IEEE80211_MSG_INPUT,
 			    ni->ni_macaddr, "data", "%s", "demic error");
 			vap->iv_stats.is_rx_demicfail++;
@@ -834,7 +864,8 @@ sta_input(struct ieee80211_node *ni, struct mbuf *m,
 			 * any non-PAE frames received without encryption.
 			 */
 			if ((vap->iv_flags & IEEE80211_F_DROPUNENC) &&
-			    (key == NULL && (m->m_flags & M_WEP) == 0) &&
+			    ((has_decrypted == 0) && (m->m_flags & M_WEP) == 0) &&
+			    (is_hw_decrypted == 0) &&
 			    eh->ether_type != htons(ETHERTYPE_PAE)) {
 				/*
 				 * Drop unencrypted frames.
@@ -883,6 +914,16 @@ sta_input(struct ieee80211_node *ni, struct mbuf *m,
 			    ether_sprintf(wh->i_addr2), rssi);
 		}
 #endif
+
+		/*
+		 * Note: See above for hardware offload privacy requirements.
+		 *       It also applies here.
+		 */
+
+		/*
+		 * Again, having encrypted flag set check would be good, but
+		 * then we have to also handle crypto_decap() like above.
+		 */
 		if (wh->i_fc[1] & IEEE80211_FC1_PROTECTED) {
 			if (subtype != IEEE80211_FC0_SUBTYPE_AUTH) {
 				/*
@@ -905,11 +946,16 @@ sta_input(struct ieee80211_node *ni, struct mbuf *m,
 				goto out;
 			}
 			hdrspace = ieee80211_hdrspace(ic, wh);
-			key = ieee80211_crypto_decap(ni, m, hdrspace);
-			if (key == NULL) {
+
+			/*
+			 * Again, if IV/MIC was stripped, then this whole
+			 * setup will fail.  That's going to need some poking.
+			 */
+			if (ieee80211_crypto_decap(ni, m, hdrspace, &key) == 0) {
 				/* NB: stats+msgs handled in crypto_decap */
 				goto out;
 			}
+			has_decrypted = 1;
 			wh = mtod(m, struct ieee80211_frame *);
 			wh->i_fc[1] &= ~IEEE80211_FC1_PROTECTED;
 		}