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Diffstat (limited to 'crypto/x509/x509_trs.c')
-rw-r--r--crypto/x509/x509_trs.c300
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 300 deletions
diff --git a/crypto/x509/x509_trs.c b/crypto/x509/x509_trs.c
deleted file mode 100644
index a10d437735b8..000000000000
--- a/crypto/x509/x509_trs.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,300 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * Copyright 1999-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
- *
- * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
- * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
- * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
- * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
- */
-
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
-#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
-#include "crypto/x509.h"
-
-static int tr_cmp(const X509_TRUST *const *a, const X509_TRUST *const *b);
-static void trtable_free(X509_TRUST *p);
-
-static int trust_1oidany(X509_TRUST *trust, X509 *x, int flags);
-static int trust_1oid(X509_TRUST *trust, X509 *x, int flags);
-static int trust_compat(X509_TRUST *trust, X509 *x, int flags);
-
-static int obj_trust(int id, X509 *x, int flags);
-static int (*default_trust) (int id, X509 *x, int flags) = obj_trust;
-
-/*
- * WARNING: the following table should be kept in order of trust and without
- * any gaps so we can just subtract the minimum trust value to get an index
- * into the table
- */
-
-static X509_TRUST trstandard[] = {
- {X509_TRUST_COMPAT, 0, trust_compat, "compatible", 0, NULL},
- {X509_TRUST_SSL_CLIENT, 0, trust_1oidany, "SSL Client", NID_client_auth,
- NULL},
- {X509_TRUST_SSL_SERVER, 0, trust_1oidany, "SSL Server", NID_server_auth,
- NULL},
- {X509_TRUST_EMAIL, 0, trust_1oidany, "S/MIME email", NID_email_protect,
- NULL},
- {X509_TRUST_OBJECT_SIGN, 0, trust_1oidany, "Object Signer", NID_code_sign,
- NULL},
- {X509_TRUST_OCSP_SIGN, 0, trust_1oid, "OCSP responder", NID_OCSP_sign,
- NULL},
- {X509_TRUST_OCSP_REQUEST, 0, trust_1oid, "OCSP request", NID_ad_OCSP,
- NULL},
- {X509_TRUST_TSA, 0, trust_1oidany, "TSA server", NID_time_stamp, NULL}
-};
-
-#define X509_TRUST_COUNT OSSL_NELEM(trstandard)
-
-static STACK_OF(X509_TRUST) *trtable = NULL;
-
-static int tr_cmp(const X509_TRUST *const *a, const X509_TRUST *const *b)
-{
- return (*a)->trust - (*b)->trust;
-}
-
-int (*X509_TRUST_set_default(int (*trust) (int, X509 *, int))) (int, X509 *,
- int) {
- int (*oldtrust) (int, X509 *, int);
- oldtrust = default_trust;
- default_trust = trust;
- return oldtrust;
-}
-
-int X509_check_trust(X509 *x, int id, int flags)
-{
- X509_TRUST *pt;
- int idx;
-
- /* We get this as a default value */
- if (id == X509_TRUST_DEFAULT)
- return obj_trust(NID_anyExtendedKeyUsage, x,
- flags | X509_TRUST_DO_SS_COMPAT);
- idx = X509_TRUST_get_by_id(id);
- if (idx == -1)
- return default_trust(id, x, flags);
- pt = X509_TRUST_get0(idx);
- return pt->check_trust(pt, x, flags);
-}
-
-int X509_TRUST_get_count(void)
-{
- if (!trtable)
- return X509_TRUST_COUNT;
- return sk_X509_TRUST_num(trtable) + X509_TRUST_COUNT;
-}
-
-X509_TRUST *X509_TRUST_get0(int idx)
-{
- if (idx < 0)
- return NULL;
- if (idx < (int)X509_TRUST_COUNT)
- return trstandard + idx;
- return sk_X509_TRUST_value(trtable, idx - X509_TRUST_COUNT);
-}
-
-int X509_TRUST_get_by_id(int id)
-{
- X509_TRUST tmp;
- int idx;
-
- if ((id >= X509_TRUST_MIN) && (id <= X509_TRUST_MAX))
- return id - X509_TRUST_MIN;
- if (trtable == NULL)
- return -1;
- tmp.trust = id;
- idx = sk_X509_TRUST_find(trtable, &tmp);
- if (idx < 0)
- return -1;
- return idx + X509_TRUST_COUNT;
-}
-
-int X509_TRUST_set(int *t, int trust)
-{
- if (X509_TRUST_get_by_id(trust) == -1) {
- X509err(X509_F_X509_TRUST_SET, X509_R_INVALID_TRUST);
- return 0;
- }
- *t = trust;
- return 1;
-}
-
-int X509_TRUST_add(int id, int flags, int (*ck) (X509_TRUST *, X509 *, int),
- const char *name, int arg1, void *arg2)
-{
- int idx;
- X509_TRUST *trtmp;
- /*
- * This is set according to what we change: application can't set it
- */
- flags &= ~X509_TRUST_DYNAMIC;
- /* This will always be set for application modified trust entries */
- flags |= X509_TRUST_DYNAMIC_NAME;
- /* Get existing entry if any */
- idx = X509_TRUST_get_by_id(id);
- /* Need a new entry */
- if (idx == -1) {
- if ((trtmp = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*trtmp))) == NULL) {
- X509err(X509_F_X509_TRUST_ADD, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return 0;
- }
- trtmp->flags = X509_TRUST_DYNAMIC;
- } else
- trtmp = X509_TRUST_get0(idx);
-
- /* OPENSSL_free existing name if dynamic */
- if (trtmp->flags & X509_TRUST_DYNAMIC_NAME)
- OPENSSL_free(trtmp->name);
- /* dup supplied name */
- if ((trtmp->name = OPENSSL_strdup(name)) == NULL) {
- X509err(X509_F_X509_TRUST_ADD, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
- /* Keep the dynamic flag of existing entry */
- trtmp->flags &= X509_TRUST_DYNAMIC;
- /* Set all other flags */
- trtmp->flags |= flags;
-
- trtmp->trust = id;
- trtmp->check_trust = ck;
- trtmp->arg1 = arg1;
- trtmp->arg2 = arg2;
-
- /* If its a new entry manage the dynamic table */
- if (idx == -1) {
- if (trtable == NULL
- && (trtable = sk_X509_TRUST_new(tr_cmp)) == NULL) {
- X509err(X509_F_X509_TRUST_ADD, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;;
- }
- if (!sk_X509_TRUST_push(trtable, trtmp)) {
- X509err(X509_F_X509_TRUST_ADD, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
- }
- return 1;
- err:
- if (idx == -1) {
- OPENSSL_free(trtmp->name);
- OPENSSL_free(trtmp);
- }
- return 0;
-}
-
-static void trtable_free(X509_TRUST *p)
-{
- if (!p)
- return;
- if (p->flags & X509_TRUST_DYNAMIC) {
- if (p->flags & X509_TRUST_DYNAMIC_NAME)
- OPENSSL_free(p->name);
- OPENSSL_free(p);
- }
-}
-
-void X509_TRUST_cleanup(void)
-{
- sk_X509_TRUST_pop_free(trtable, trtable_free);
- trtable = NULL;
-}
-
-int X509_TRUST_get_flags(const X509_TRUST *xp)
-{
- return xp->flags;
-}
-
-char *X509_TRUST_get0_name(const X509_TRUST *xp)
-{
- return xp->name;
-}
-
-int X509_TRUST_get_trust(const X509_TRUST *xp)
-{
- return xp->trust;
-}
-
-static int trust_1oidany(X509_TRUST *trust, X509 *x, int flags)
-{
- /*
- * Declare the chain verified if the desired trust OID is not rejected in
- * any auxiliary trust info for this certificate, and the OID is either
- * expressly trusted, or else either "anyEKU" is trusted, or the
- * certificate is self-signed.
- */
- flags |= X509_TRUST_DO_SS_COMPAT | X509_TRUST_OK_ANY_EKU;
- return obj_trust(trust->arg1, x, flags);
-}
-
-static int trust_1oid(X509_TRUST *trust, X509 *x, int flags)
-{
- /*
- * Declare the chain verified only if the desired trust OID is not
- * rejected and is expressly trusted. Neither "anyEKU" nor "compat"
- * trust in self-signed certificates apply.
- */
- flags &= ~(X509_TRUST_DO_SS_COMPAT | X509_TRUST_OK_ANY_EKU);
- return obj_trust(trust->arg1, x, flags);
-}
-
-static int trust_compat(X509_TRUST *trust, X509 *x, int flags)
-{
- /* Call for side-effect of computing hash and caching extensions */
- if (X509_check_purpose(x, -1, 0) != 1)
- return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
- if ((flags & X509_TRUST_NO_SS_COMPAT) == 0 && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SS))
- return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
- else
- return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
-}
-
-static int obj_trust(int id, X509 *x, int flags)
-{
- X509_CERT_AUX *ax = x->aux;
- int i;
-
- if (ax && ax->reject) {
- for (i = 0; i < sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(ax->reject); i++) {
- ASN1_OBJECT *obj = sk_ASN1_OBJECT_value(ax->reject, i);
- int nid = OBJ_obj2nid(obj);
-
- if (nid == id || (nid == NID_anyExtendedKeyUsage &&
- (flags & X509_TRUST_OK_ANY_EKU)))
- return X509_TRUST_REJECTED;
- }
- }
-
- if (ax && ax->trust) {
- for (i = 0; i < sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(ax->trust); i++) {
- ASN1_OBJECT *obj = sk_ASN1_OBJECT_value(ax->trust, i);
- int nid = OBJ_obj2nid(obj);
-
- if (nid == id || (nid == NID_anyExtendedKeyUsage &&
- (flags & X509_TRUST_OK_ANY_EKU)))
- return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
- }
- /*
- * Reject when explicit trust EKU are set and none match.
- *
- * Returning untrusted is enough for for full chains that end in
- * self-signed roots, because when explicit trust is specified it
- * suppresses the default blanket trust of self-signed objects.
- *
- * But for partial chains, this is not enough, because absent a similar
- * trust-self-signed policy, non matching EKUs are indistinguishable
- * from lack of EKU constraints.
- *
- * Therefore, failure to match any trusted purpose must trigger an
- * explicit reject.
- */
- return X509_TRUST_REJECTED;
- }
-
- if ((flags & X509_TRUST_DO_SS_COMPAT) == 0)
- return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
-
- /*
- * Not rejected, and there is no list of accepted uses, try compat.
- */
- return trust_compat(NULL, x, flags);
-}
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.25.1) at 2025-02-23 12:53:17 +0000