This commit was manufactured by cvs2svn to create branch 'RELENG_4'.

4 files changed, 1053 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/lib/libc/gen/readpassphrase.3 b/lib/libc/gen/readpassphrase.3
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..cfa6cf0631db
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lib/libc/gen/readpassphrase.3
@@ -0,0 +1,187 @@
+.\"	$OpenBSD: readpassphrase.3,v 1.7 2001/12/15 15:37:51 millert Exp $
+.\"
+.\" Copyright (c) 2000 Todd C. Miller <Todd.Miller@courtesan.com>
+.\" All rights reserved.
+.\"
+.\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+.\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+.\" are met:
+.\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+.\"    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+.\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+.\"    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+.\"    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+.\" 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products
+.\"    derived from this software without specific prior written permission.
+.\"
+.\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES,
+.\" INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY
+.\" AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL
+.\" THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL,
+.\" EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO,
+.\" PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS;
+.\" OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY,
+.\" WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR
+.\" OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF
+.\" ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+.\"
+.\" $FreeBSD$
+.\"
+.Dd December 7, 2001
+.Dt READPASSPHRASE 3
+.Os
+.Sh NAME
+.Nm readpassphrase
+.Nd get a passphrase from the user
+.Sh SYNOPSIS
+.In readpassphrase.h
+.Ft "char *"
+.Fn readpassphrase "const char *prompt" "char *buf" "size_t bufsiz" "int flags"
+.Sh DESCRIPTION
+The
+.Fn readpassphrase
+function displays a prompt to, and reads in a passphrase from,
+.Pa /dev/tty .
+If this file is inaccessible
+and the
+.Dv RPP_REQUIRE_TTY
+flag is not set,
+.Fn readpassphrase
+displays the prompt on the standard error output and reads from the standard
+input.
+In this case it is generally not possible to turn off echo.
+.Pp
+Up to
+.Fa bufsiz
+\- 1 characters (one is for the
+.Dv NUL )
+are read into the provided buffer
+.Fa buf .
+Any additional
+characters and the terminating newline (or return) character are discarded.
+.Pp
+.Fn readpassphrase
+takes the following optional
+.Fa flags :
+.Pp
+.Bl -tag -width ".Dv RPP_REQUIRE_TTY" -compact
+.It Dv RPP_ECHO_OFF
+turn off echo (default behavior)
+.It Dv RPP_ECHO_ON
+leave echo on
+.It Dv RPP_REQUIRE_TTY
+fail if there is no tty
+.It Dv RPP_FORCELOWER
+force input to lower case
+.It Dv RPP_FORCEUPPER
+force input to upper case
+.It Dv RPP_SEVENBIT
+strip the high bit from input
+.El
+.Pp
+The calling process should zero the passphrase as soon as possible to
+avoid leaving the cleartext passphrase visible in the process's address
+space.
+.Sh RETURN VALUES
+Upon successful completion,
+.Fn readpassphrase
+returns a pointer to the null-terminated passphrase.
+If an error is encountered, the terminal state is restored and
+a
+.Dv NULL
+pointer is returned.
+.Sh ERRORS
+.Bl -tag -width Er
+.It Bq Er EINTR
+The
+.Fn readpassphrase
+function was interrupted by a signal.
+.It Bq Er EINVAL
+The
+.Fa bufsiz
+argument was zero.
+.It Bq Er EIO
+The process is a member of a background process attempting to read
+from its controlling terminal, the process is ignoring or blocking
+the
+.Dv SIGTTIN
+signal or the process group is orphaned.
+.It Bq Er EMFILE
+The process has already reached its limit for open file descriptors.
+.It Bq Er ENFILE
+The system file table is full.
+.It Bq Er ENOTTY
+There is no controlling terminal and the
+.Dv RPP_REQUIRE_TTY
+flag was specified.
+.El
+.Sh EXAMPLES
+The following code fragment will read a passphrase from
+.Pa /dev/tty
+into the buffer
+.Fa passbuf .
+.Bd -literal -offset indent
+char passbuf[1024];
+
+\&...
+
+if (readpassphrase("Response: ", passbuf, sizeof(passbuf),
+    RPP_REQUIRE_TTY) == NULL)
+	errx(1, "unable to read passphrase");
+
+if (compare(transform(passbuf), epass) != 0)
+	errx(1, "bad passphrase");
+
+\&...
+
+memset(passbuf, 0, sizeof(passbuf));
+.Ed
+.Sh SIGNALS
+.Fn readpassphrase
+will catch the following signals:
+.Pp
+.Bl -tag -compact
+.It Dv SIGINT
+.It Dv SIGHUP
+.It Dv SIGQUIT
+.It Dv SIGTERM
+.It Dv SIGTSTP
+.It Dv SIGTTIN
+.It Dv SIGTTOU
+.El
+.Pp
+When one of the above signals is intercepted, terminal echo will
+be restored if it had previously been turned off.
+If a signal handler was installed for the signal when
+.Fn readpassphrase
+was called that handler is then executed.
+If no handler was previously installed for the signal then the
+default action is taken as per
+.Xr sigaction 2 .
+.Pp
+The
+.Dv SIGTSTP , SIGTTIN ,
+and
+.Dv SIGTTOU
+signals (stop signal generated from keyboard or due to terminal I/O
+from a background proccess) are treated specially.
+When the process is resumed after it has been stopped,
+.Fn readpassphrase
+will reprint the prompt and the user may then enter a passphrase.
+.Sh FILES
+.Bl -tag -width ".Pa /dev/tty" -compact
+.It Pa /dev/tty
+.El
+.Sh SEE ALSO
+.Xr sigaction 2 ,
+.Xr getpass 3
+.Sh STANDARDS
+The
+.Fn readpassphrase
+function is an
+extension and should not be used if portability is desired.
+.Sh HISTORY
+The
+.Fn readpassphrase
+function first appeared in
+.Ox 2.9 .
diff --git a/lib/libpam/modules/pam_opie/pam_opie.8 b/lib/libpam/modules/pam_opie/pam_opie.8
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..bae696d1b16e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lib/libpam/modules/pam_opie/pam_opie.8
@@ -0,0 +1,123 @@
+.\" Copyright (c) 2001 Mark R V Murray
+.\" All rights reserved.
+.\" Copyright (c) 2002 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
+.\" All rights reserved.
+.\"
+.\" Portions of this software were developed for the FreeBSD Project by
+.\" ThinkSec AS and NAI Labs, the Security Research Division of Network
+.\" Associates, Inc.  under DARPA/SPAWAR contract N66001-01-C-8035
+.\" ("CBOSS"), as part of the DARPA CHATS research program.
+.\"
+.\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+.\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+.\" are met:
+.\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+.\"    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+.\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+.\"    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+.\"    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+.\" 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote
+.\"    products derived from this software without specific prior written
+.\"    permission.
+.\"
+.\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
+.\" ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+.\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+.\" ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+.\" FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+.\" DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+.\" OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+.\" HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+.\" LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+.\" OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+.\" SUCH DAMAGE.
+.\"
+.\" $FreeBSD$
+.\"
+.Dd July 7, 2001
+.Dt PAM_OPIE 8
+.Os
+.Sh NAME
+.Nm pam_opie
+.Nd OPIE PAM module
+.Sh SYNOPSIS
+.Op Ar service-name
+.Ar module-type
+.Ar control-flag
+.Pa pam_opie
+.Op Ar options
+.Sh DESCRIPTION
+The OPIE authentication service module for PAM,
+.Nm
+provides functionality for only one PAM category:
+that of authentication.
+In terms of the
+.Ar module-type
+parameter, this is the
+.Dq Li auth
+feature.
+It also provides a null function for session management.
+.Pp
+Note that this module does not enforce
+.Xr opieaccess 5
+checks.
+There is a separate module,
+.Xr pam_opieaccess 8 ,
+for this purpose.
+.Ss OPIE Authentication Module
+The OPIE authentication component
+provides functions to verify the identity of a user
+.Pq Fn pam_sm_authenticate ,
+which obtains the relevant
+.Xr opie 4
+credentials.
+It provides the user with an OPIE challenge,
+and verifies that this is correct with
+.Xr opiechallenge 3 .
+.Pp
+The following options may be passed to the authentication module:
+.Bl -tag -width ".Cm auth_as_self"
+.It Cm debug
+.Xr syslog 3
+debugging information at
+.Dv LOG_DEBUG
+level.
+.It Cm auth_as_self
+This option will require the user
+to authenticate themself as the user
+given by
+.Xr getlogin 2 ,
+not as the account they are attempting to access.
+This is primarily for services like
+.Xr su 1 ,
+where the user's ability to retype
+their own password
+might be deemed sufficient.
+.It Cm no_fake_prompts
+Do not generate fake challenges for users who do not have an OPIE key.
+Note that this can leak information to a hypothetical attacker about
+who uses OPIE and who does not, but it can be useful on systems where
+some users want to use OPIE but most do not.
+.El
+.Pp
+Note that
+.Nm
+ignores the standard options
+.Cm try_first_pass
+and
+.Cm use_first_pass ,
+since a challenge must be generated before the user can submit a valid
+response.
+.Sh FILES
+.Bl -tag -width ".Pa /etc/opiekeys" -compact
+.It Pa /etc/opiekeys
+default OPIE password database.
+.El
+.Sh SEE ALSO
+.Xr passwd 1 ,
+.Xr getlogin 2 ,
+.Xr opiechallenge 3 ,
+.Xr syslog 3 ,
+.Xr opie 4 ,
+.Xr pam.conf 5 ,
+.Xr pam 8
diff --git a/lib/libpam/modules/pam_ssh/pam_ssh.8 b/lib/libpam/modules/pam_ssh/pam_ssh.8
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..a932d0255671
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lib/libpam/modules/pam_ssh/pam_ssh.8
@@ -0,0 +1,148 @@
+.\" Copyright (c) 2001 Mark R V Murray
+.\" All rights reserved.
+.\" Copyright (c) 2001 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
+.\" All rights reserved.
+.\"
+.\" This software was developed for the FreeBSD Project by ThinkSec AS and
+.\" NAI Labs, the Security Research Division of Network Associates, Inc.
+.\" under DARPA/SPAWAR contract N66001-01-C-8035 ("CBOSS"), as part of the
+.\" DARPA CHATS research program.
+.\"
+.\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+.\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+.\" are met:
+.\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+.\"    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+.\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+.\"    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+.\"    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+.\" 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote
+.\"    products derived from this software without specific prior written
+.\"    permission.
+.\"
+.\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
+.\" ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+.\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+.\" ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+.\" FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+.\" DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+.\" OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+.\" HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+.\" LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+.\" OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+.\" SUCH DAMAGE.
+.\"
+.\" $FreeBSD$
+.\"
+.Dd November 26, 2001
+.Dt PAM_SSH 8
+.Os
+.Sh NAME
+.Nm pam_ssh
+.Nd SSH PAM module
+.Sh SYNOPSIS
+.Op Ar service-name
+.Ar module-type
+.Ar control-flag
+.Pa pam_ssh
+.Op Ar options
+.Sh DESCRIPTION
+The
+SSH
+authentication service module for PAM,
+.Nm
+provides functionality for two PAM categories:
+authentication
+and session management.
+In terms of the
+.Ar module-type
+parameter, they are the
+.Dq Li auth
+and
+.Dq Li session
+features.
+It also provides null functions for the remaining categories.
+.Ss SSH Authentication Module
+The
+SSH
+authentication component
+provides a function to verify the identity of a user
+.Pq Fn pam_sm_authenticate ,
+by prompting the user for a passphrase and verifying that it can
+decrypt the target user's SSH key using that passphrase.
+.Pp
+The following options may be passed to the authentication module:
+.Bl -tag -width ".Cm use_first_pass"
+.It Cm debug
+.Xr syslog 3
+debugging information at
+.Dv LOG_DEBUG
+level.
+.It Cm use_first_pass
+If the authentication module
+is not the first in the stack,
+and a previous module
+obtained the user's password,
+that password is used
+to authenticate the user.
+If this fails,
+the authentication module returns failure
+without prompting the user for a password.
+This option has no effect
+if the authentication module
+is the first in the stack,
+or if no previous modules
+obtained the user's password.
+.It Cm try_first_pass
+This option is similar to the
+.Cm use_first_pass
+option,
+except that if the previously obtained password fails,
+the user is prompted for another password.
+.El
+.Ss SSH Session Management Module
+The
+SSH
+session management component
+provides functions to initiate
+.Pq Fn pam_sm_open_session
+and terminate
+.Pq Fn pam_sm_close_session
+sessions.
+The
+.Fn pam_sm_open_session
+function starts an SSH agent,
+passing it any private keys it decrypted
+during the authentication phase,
+and sets the environment variables
+the agent specifies.
+The
+.Fn pam_sm_close_session
+function kills the previously started SSH agent
+by sending it a
+.Dv SIGTERM .
+.Pp
+The following options may be passed to the session management module:
+.Bl -tag -width ".Cm use_first_pass"
+.It Cm debug
+.Xr syslog 3
+debugging information at
+.Dv LOG_DEBUG
+level.
+.El
+.Sh FILES
+.Bl -tag -width ".Pa $HOME/.ssh2/id_dsa_*" -compact
+.It Pa $HOME/.ssh/identity
+SSH1/OpenSSH RSA key.
+.It Pa $HOME/.ssh/id_dsa
+OpenSSH DSA key.
+.It Pa $HOME/.ssh2/id_rsa_*
+SSH2 RSA keys.
+.It Pa $HOME/.ssh2/id_dsa_*
+SSH2 DSA keys.
+.El
+.Sh SEE ALSO
+.Xr ssh-agent 1 ,
+.Xr syslog 3 ,
+.Xr pam.conf 5 ,
+.Xr pam 8
diff --git a/lib/libpam/modules/pam_ssh/pam_ssh.c b/lib/libpam/modules/pam_ssh/pam_ssh.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..7285c79aa3db
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lib/libpam/modules/pam_ssh/pam_ssh.c
@@ -0,0 +1,595 @@
+/*-
+ * Copyright (c) 1999, 2000 Andrew J. Korty
+ * All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2001 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Portions of this software were developed for the FreeBSD Project by
+ * ThinkSec AS and NAI Labs, the Security Research Division of Network
+ * Associates, Inc.  under DARPA/SPAWAR contract N66001-01-C-8035
+ * ("CBOSS"), as part of the DARPA CHATS research program.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote
+ *    products derived from this software without specific prior written
+ *    permission.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include <sys/cdefs.h>
+__FBSDID("$FreeBSD$");
+
+#include <sys/param.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <sys/wait.h>
+
+#include <dirent.h>
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <ssh.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <syslog.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#define	PAM_SM_AUTH
+#define PAM_SM_ACCOUNT
+#define PAM_SM_SESSION
+#define PAM_SM_PASSWORD
+
+#include <security/pam_appl.h>
+#include <security/pam_modules.h>
+#include <security/pam_mod_misc.h>
+
+#include <openssl/dsa.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+
+#include "key.h"
+#include "authfd.h"
+#include "authfile.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "pam_ssh.h"
+
+static int auth_via_key(pam_handle_t *, int, const char *, const char *, const struct passwd *, const char *);
+static void key_cleanup(pam_handle_t *, void *, int);
+static void ssh_cleanup(pam_handle_t *, void *, int);
+
+/*
+ * Generic cleanup function for SSH "Key" type.
+ */
+
+static void
+key_cleanup(pam_handle_t *pamh __unused, void *data, int error_status __unused)
+{
+	if (data)
+		key_free(data);
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * Generic PAM cleanup function for this module.
+ */
+
+static void
+ssh_cleanup(pam_handle_t *pamh __unused, void *data, int error_status __unused)
+{
+	if (data)
+		free(data);
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * Authenticate a user's key by trying to decrypt it with the password
+ * provided.  The key and its comment are then stored for later
+ * retrieval by the session phase.  An increasing index is embedded in
+ * the PAM variable names so this function may be called multiple times
+ * for multiple keys.
+ */
+
+static int
+auth_via_key(pam_handle_t *pamh, int type, const char *file,
+    const char *dir, const struct passwd *user, const char *pass)
+{
+	char		*comment;		/* private key comment */
+	char		*data_name;		/* PAM state */
+	static int	 indx = 0;		/* for saved keys */
+	Key		*key;			/* user's key */
+	char		*path;			/* to key files */
+	int		 retval;		/* from calls */
+	uid_t		 saved_uid;		/* caller's uid */
+
+	/* locate the user's private key file */
+	if (!asprintf(&path, "%s/%s", dir, file)) {
+		syslog(LOG_CRIT, "%s: %m", MODULE_NAME);
+		return PAM_SERVICE_ERR;
+	}
+	saved_uid = geteuid();
+	/*
+	 * Try to decrypt the private key with the passphrase provided.
+	 * If success, the user is authenticated.
+	 */
+	seteuid(user->pw_uid);
+	key = key_load_private_type(type, path, pass, &comment);
+	free(path);
+	seteuid(saved_uid);
+	if (key == NULL)
+		return PAM_AUTH_ERR;
+	/*
+	 * Save the key and comment to pass to ssh-agent in the session
+	 * phase.
+	 */
+	if (!asprintf(&data_name, "ssh_private_key_%d", indx)) {
+		syslog(LOG_CRIT, "%s: %m", MODULE_NAME);
+		free(comment);
+		return PAM_SERVICE_ERR;
+	}
+	retval = pam_set_data(pamh, data_name, key, key_cleanup);
+	free(data_name);
+	if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS) {
+		key_free(key);
+		free(comment);
+		return retval;
+	}
+	if (!asprintf(&data_name, "ssh_key_comment_%d", indx)) {
+		syslog(LOG_CRIT, "%s: %m", MODULE_NAME);
+		free(comment);
+		return PAM_SERVICE_ERR;
+	}
+	retval = pam_set_data(pamh, data_name, comment, ssh_cleanup);
+	free(data_name);
+	if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS) {
+		free(comment);
+		return retval;
+	}
+	++indx;
+	return PAM_SUCCESS;
+}
+
+
+PAM_EXTERN int
+pam_sm_authenticate(pam_handle_t *pamh, int flags __unused, int argc, const char **argv)
+{
+	struct options	 options;		/* module options */
+	int		 authenticated;		/* user authenticated? */
+	char		*dotdir;		/* .ssh2 dir name */
+	struct dirent	*dotdir_ent;		/* .ssh2 dir entry */
+	DIR		*dotdir_p;		/* .ssh2 dir pointer */
+	const char	*pass;			/* passphrase */
+	struct passwd	*pwd;			/* user's passwd entry */
+	struct passwd	*pwd_keep;		/* our own copy */
+	int		 retval;		/* from calls */
+	int		 pam_auth_dsa;		/* Authorised via DSA */
+	int		 pam_auth_rsa;		/* Authorised via RSA */
+	const char	*user;			/* username */
+
+	pam_std_option(&options, NULL, argc, argv);
+
+	PAM_LOG("Options processed");
+
+	retval = pam_get_user(pamh, &user, NULL);
+	if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS)
+		PAM_RETURN(retval);
+	pwd = getpwnam(user);
+	if (pwd == NULL || pwd->pw_dir == NULL)
+		/* delay? */
+		PAM_RETURN(PAM_AUTH_ERR);
+
+	PAM_LOG("Got user: %s", user);
+
+	/*
+	 * Pass prompt message to application and receive
+	 * passphrase.
+	 */
+	retval = pam_get_authtok(pamh, &pass, NEED_PASSPHRASE);
+	if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS)
+		PAM_RETURN(retval);
+	OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms();	/* required for DSA */
+
+	PAM_LOG("Got passphrase");
+
+	/*
+	 * Either the DSA or the RSA key will authenticate us, but if
+	 * we can decrypt both, we'll do so here so we can cache them in
+	 * the session phase.
+	 */
+	if (!asprintf(&dotdir, "%s/%s", pwd->pw_dir, SSH_CLIENT_DIR)) {
+		syslog(LOG_CRIT, "%s: %m", MODULE_NAME);
+		PAM_RETURN(PAM_SERVICE_ERR);
+	}
+	pam_auth_dsa = auth_via_key(pamh, KEY_DSA, SSH_CLIENT_ID_DSA, dotdir,
+	    pwd, pass);
+	pam_auth_rsa = auth_via_key(pamh, KEY_RSA1, SSH_CLIENT_IDENTITY, dotdir,
+	    pwd, pass);
+	authenticated = 0;
+	if (pam_auth_dsa == PAM_SUCCESS)
+		authenticated++;
+	if (pam_auth_rsa == PAM_SUCCESS)
+		authenticated++;
+
+	PAM_LOG("Done pre-authenticating; got %d", authenticated);
+
+	/*
+	 * Compatibility with SSH2 from SSH Communications Security.
+	 */
+	if (!asprintf(&dotdir, "%s/%s", pwd->pw_dir, SSH2_CLIENT_DIR)) {
+		syslog(LOG_CRIT, "%s: %m", MODULE_NAME);
+		PAM_RETURN(PAM_SERVICE_ERR);
+	}
+	/*
+	 * Try to load anything that looks like a private key.  For
+	 * now, we only support DSA and RSA keys.
+	 */
+	dotdir_p = opendir(dotdir);
+	while (dotdir_p && (dotdir_ent = readdir(dotdir_p))) {
+		/* skip public keys */
+		if (strcmp(&dotdir_ent->d_name[dotdir_ent->d_namlen -
+		    strlen(SSH2_PUB_SUFFIX)], SSH2_PUB_SUFFIX) == 0)
+			continue;
+		/* DSA keys */
+		if (strncmp(dotdir_ent->d_name, SSH2_DSA_PREFIX,
+		    strlen(SSH2_DSA_PREFIX)) == 0)
+			retval = auth_via_key(pamh, KEY_DSA,
+			    dotdir_ent->d_name, dotdir, pwd, pass);
+		/* RSA keys */
+		else if (strncmp(dotdir_ent->d_name, SSH2_RSA_PREFIX,
+		    strlen(SSH2_RSA_PREFIX)) == 0)
+			retval = auth_via_key(pamh, KEY_RSA,
+			    dotdir_ent->d_name, dotdir, pwd, pass);
+		/* skip other files */
+		else
+			continue;
+		authenticated += (retval == PAM_SUCCESS);
+	}
+	if (!authenticated) {
+		PAM_VERBOSE_ERROR("SSH authentication refused");
+		PAM_RETURN(PAM_AUTH_ERR);
+	}
+
+	PAM_LOG("Done authenticating; got %d", authenticated);
+
+	/*
+	 * Copy the passwd entry (in case successive calls are made)
+	 * and save it for the session phase.
+	 */
+	pwd_keep = malloc(sizeof *pwd);
+	if (pwd_keep == NULL) {
+		syslog(LOG_CRIT, "%m");
+		PAM_RETURN(PAM_SERVICE_ERR);
+	}
+	memcpy(pwd_keep, pwd, sizeof *pwd_keep);
+	retval = pam_set_data(pamh, "ssh_passwd_entry", pwd_keep, ssh_cleanup);
+	if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS) {
+		free(pwd_keep);
+		PAM_RETURN(retval);
+	}
+
+	PAM_LOG("Saved ssh_passwd_entry");
+
+	PAM_RETURN(PAM_SUCCESS);
+}
+
+
+PAM_EXTERN int
+pam_sm_setcred(pam_handle_t *pamh __unused, int flags __unused, int argc, const char **argv)
+{
+	struct options	 options;		/* module options */
+
+	pam_std_option(&options, NULL, argc, argv);
+
+	PAM_LOG("Options processed");
+
+	PAM_RETURN(PAM_SUCCESS);
+}
+
+PAM_EXTERN int
+pam_sm_acct_mgmt(pam_handle_t *pamh __unused, int flags __unused, int argc ,const char **argv)
+{
+	struct options options;
+
+	pam_std_option(&options, NULL, argc, argv);
+
+	PAM_LOG("Options processed");
+
+	PAM_RETURN(PAM_IGNORE);
+}
+
+PAM_EXTERN int
+pam_sm_chauthtok(pam_handle_t *pamh __unused, int flags __unused, int argc, const char **argv)
+{
+	struct options options;
+
+	pam_std_option(&options, NULL, argc, argv);
+
+	PAM_LOG("Options processed");
+
+	PAM_RETURN(PAM_IGNORE);
+}
+
+typedef AuthenticationConnection AC;
+
+PAM_EXTERN int
+pam_sm_open_session(pam_handle_t *pamh, int flags __unused, int argc, const char **argv)
+{
+	struct options	 options;		/* module options */
+	AC		*ac;			/* to ssh-agent */
+	char		*agent_socket;		/* agent socket */
+	char		*comment;		/* on private key */
+	char		*env_end;		/* end of env */
+	char		*env_file;		/* to store env */
+	FILE		*env_fp;		/* env_file handle */
+	char		*env_value;		/* envariable value */
+	char		*data_name;		/* PAM state */
+	int		 final;			/* final return value */
+	int		 indx;			/* for saved keys */
+	Key		*key;			/* user's private key */
+	FILE		*lpipe;			/* ssh-agent handle */
+	struct passwd	*pwd;			/* user's passwd entry */
+	int		 retval;		/* from calls */
+	uid_t		 saved_uid;		/* caller's uid */
+	const char	*tty;			/* tty or display name */
+	char		 hname[MAXHOSTNAMELEN];	/* local hostname */
+	char		 env_string[BUFSIZ];   	/* environment string */
+
+	pam_std_option(&options, NULL, argc, argv);
+
+	PAM_LOG("Options processed");
+
+	/* dump output of ssh-agent in ~/.ssh */
+	retval = pam_get_data(pamh, "ssh_passwd_entry", (const void **)&pwd);
+	if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS)
+		PAM_RETURN(retval);
+
+	PAM_LOG("Got ssh_passwd_entry");
+
+	/* use the tty or X display name in the filename */
+	retval = pam_get_item(pamh, PAM_TTY, (const void **)&tty);
+	if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS)
+		PAM_RETURN(retval);
+
+	PAM_LOG("Got TTY");
+
+	if (gethostname(hname, sizeof hname) == 0) {
+		if (asprintf(&env_file, "%s/.ssh/agent-%s%s%s",
+		    pwd->pw_dir, hname, *tty == ':' ? "" : ":", tty)
+		    == -1) {
+			syslog(LOG_CRIT, "%s: %m", MODULE_NAME);
+			PAM_RETURN(PAM_SERVICE_ERR);
+		}
+	}
+	else if (asprintf(&env_file, "%s/.ssh/agent-%s", pwd->pw_dir,
+	    tty) == -1) {
+		syslog(LOG_CRIT, "%s: %m", MODULE_NAME);
+		PAM_RETURN(PAM_SERVICE_ERR);
+	}
+
+	PAM_LOG("Got env_file: %s", env_file);
+
+	/* save the filename so we can delete the file on session close */
+	retval = pam_set_data(pamh, "ssh_agent_env", env_file, ssh_cleanup);
+	if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS) {
+		free(env_file);
+		PAM_RETURN(retval);
+	}
+
+	PAM_LOG("Saved env_file");
+
+	/* start the agent as the user */
+	saved_uid = geteuid();
+	seteuid(pwd->pw_uid);
+	env_fp = fopen(env_file, "w");
+	if (env_fp != NULL)
+		chmod(env_file, S_IRUSR);
+	lpipe = popen(SSH_AGENT, "r");
+	seteuid(saved_uid);
+	if (!lpipe) {
+		syslog(LOG_ERR, "%s: %s: %m", MODULE_NAME, SSH_AGENT);
+		if (env_fp)
+			fclose(env_fp);
+		PAM_RETURN(PAM_SESSION_ERR);
+	}
+
+	PAM_LOG("Agent started as user");
+
+	/*
+	 * Save environment for application with pam_putenv().
+	 */
+	agent_socket = NULL;
+	while (fgets(env_string, sizeof env_string, lpipe)) {
+		if (env_fp)
+			fputs(env_string, env_fp);
+		env_value = strchr(env_string, '=');
+		if (env_value == NULL)
+			continue;
+		env_end = strchr(env_value, ';');
+		if (env_end == NULL)
+				continue;
+		*env_end = '\0';
+		/* pass to the application ... */
+		retval = pam_putenv(pamh, env_string);
+		if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS) {
+			pclose(lpipe);
+			if (env_fp)
+				fclose(env_fp);
+			PAM_RETURN(PAM_SERVICE_ERR);
+		}
+
+		PAM_LOG("Put to environment: %s", env_string);
+
+		*env_value++ = '\0';
+		if (strcmp(&env_string[strlen(env_string) -
+		    strlen(ENV_SOCKET_SUFFIX)], ENV_SOCKET_SUFFIX) == 0) {
+			agent_socket = strdup(env_value);
+			if (agent_socket == NULL) {
+				syslog(LOG_CRIT, "%s: %m", MODULE_NAME);
+				PAM_RETURN(PAM_SERVICE_ERR);
+			}
+		}
+		else if (strcmp(&env_string[strlen(env_string) -
+		    strlen(ENV_PID_SUFFIX)], ENV_PID_SUFFIX) == 0) {
+			env_value = strdup(env_value);
+			if (env_value == NULL) {
+				syslog(LOG_CRIT, "%s: %m", MODULE_NAME);
+				PAM_RETURN(PAM_SERVICE_ERR);
+			}
+			retval = pam_set_data(pamh, "ssh_agent_pid",
+			    env_value, ssh_cleanup);
+			if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS)
+				PAM_RETURN(retval);
+			PAM_LOG("Environment write successful");
+		}
+	}
+	if (env_fp)
+		fclose(env_fp);
+	retval = pclose(lpipe);
+	switch (retval) {
+	case -1:
+		syslog(LOG_ERR, "%s: %s: %m", MODULE_NAME, SSH_AGENT);
+		PAM_RETURN(PAM_SESSION_ERR);
+	case 0:
+		break;
+	case 127:
+		syslog(LOG_ERR, "%s: cannot execute %s", MODULE_NAME,
+		    SSH_AGENT);
+		PAM_RETURN(PAM_SESSION_ERR);
+	default:
+		syslog(LOG_ERR, "%s: %s exited %s %d", MODULE_NAME,
+		    SSH_AGENT, WIFSIGNALED(retval) ? "on signal" :
+		    "with status", WIFSIGNALED(retval) ? WTERMSIG(retval) :
+		    WEXITSTATUS(retval));
+		PAM_RETURN(PAM_SESSION_ERR);
+	}
+	if (agent_socket == NULL)
+		PAM_RETURN(PAM_SESSION_ERR);
+
+	PAM_LOG("Environment saved");
+
+	/*
+	 * Connect to the agent.
+	 *
+	 * XXX Because ssh_get_authentication_connection() gets the
+	 * XXX agent parameters from the environment, we have to
+	 * XXX temporarily replace the environment with the PAM
+	 * XXX environment list.  This is a hack.
+	 */
+	{
+		extern char **environ;
+		char **saved, **evp;
+		
+		saved = environ;
+		if ((environ = pam_getenvlist(pamh)) == NULL) {
+			environ = saved;
+			syslog(LOG_ERR, "%s: %m", MODULE_NAME);
+			PAM_RETURN(PAM_BUF_ERR);
+		}
+		ac = ssh_get_authentication_connection();
+		for (evp = environ; *evp; evp++)
+			free(*evp);
+		free(environ);
+		environ = saved;
+	}
+	if (!ac) {
+		syslog(LOG_ERR, "%s: %s: %m", MODULE_NAME, agent_socket);
+		PAM_RETURN(PAM_SESSION_ERR);
+	}
+
+	PAM_LOG("Connected to agent");
+
+	/* hand off each private key to the agent */
+	final = 0;
+	for (indx = 0; ; indx++) {
+		if (!asprintf(&data_name, "ssh_private_key_%d", indx)) {
+			syslog(LOG_CRIT, "%s: %m", MODULE_NAME);
+			ssh_close_authentication_connection(ac);
+			PAM_RETURN(PAM_SERVICE_ERR);
+		}
+		retval = pam_get_data(pamh, data_name, (const void **)&key);
+		free(data_name);
+		if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS)
+			break;
+		if (!asprintf(&data_name, "ssh_key_comment_%d", indx)) {
+			syslog(LOG_CRIT, "%s: %m", MODULE_NAME);
+			ssh_close_authentication_connection(ac);
+			PAM_RETURN(PAM_SERVICE_ERR);
+		}
+		retval = pam_get_data(pamh, data_name, (const void **)&comment);
+		free(data_name);
+		if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS)
+			break;
+		retval = ssh_add_identity(ac, key, comment);
+		if (!final)
+			final = retval;
+	}
+	ssh_close_authentication_connection(ac);
+
+	PAM_LOG("Keys handed off");
+
+	PAM_RETURN(final ? PAM_SUCCESS : PAM_SESSION_ERR);
+}
+
+
+PAM_EXTERN int
+pam_sm_close_session(pam_handle_t *pamh, int flags __unused, int argc, const char **argv)
+{
+	struct options	 options;	/* module options */
+	const char	*env_file;	/* ssh-agent environment */
+	pid_t		 pid;		/* ssh-agent process id */
+	int	 	 retval;	/* from calls */
+	const char	*ssh_agent_pid;	/* ssh-agent pid string */
+
+	pam_std_option(&options, NULL, argc, argv);
+
+	PAM_LOG("Options processed");
+
+	/* retrieve environment filename, then remove the file */
+	retval = pam_get_data(pamh, "ssh_agent_env", (const void **)&env_file);
+	if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS)
+		PAM_RETURN(retval);
+	unlink(env_file);
+
+	PAM_LOG("Got ssh_agent_env");
+
+	/* retrieve the agent's process id */
+	retval = pam_get_data(pamh, "ssh_agent_pid", (const void **)&ssh_agent_pid);
+	if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS)
+		PAM_RETURN(retval);
+
+	PAM_LOG("Got ssh_agent_pid");
+
+	/*
+	 * Kill the agent.  SSH2 from SSH Communications Security does
+	 * not have a -k option, so we just call kill().
+	 */
+	pid = atoi(ssh_agent_pid);
+	if (pid <= 0)
+		PAM_RETURN(PAM_SESSION_ERR);
+	if (kill(pid, SIGTERM) != 0) {
+		syslog(LOG_ERR, "%s: %s: %m", MODULE_NAME, ssh_agent_pid);
+		PAM_RETURN(PAM_SESSION_ERR);
+	}
+
+	PAM_LOG("Agent killed");
+
+	PAM_RETURN(PAM_SUCCESS);
+}
+
+PAM_MODULE_ENTRY("pam_ssh");