openssh: Update to 9.8p1

Highlights from the release notes are reproduced below.  Some security
and bug fixes were previously merged into FreeBSD and have been elided.
See the upstream release notes for full details
(https://www.openssh.com/releasenotes.html).

---

Future deprecation notice
=========================

OpenSSH plans to remove support for the DSA signature algorithm in
early 2025.

Potentially-incompatible changes
--------------------------------

 * sshd(8): the server will now block client addresses that
   repeatedly fail authentication, repeatedly connect without ever
   completing authentication or that crash the server. See the
   discussion of PerSourcePenalties below for more information.
   Operators of servers that accept connections from many users, or
   servers that accept connections from addresses behind NAT or
   proxies may need to consider these settings.

 * sshd(8): the server has been split into a listener binary, sshd(8),
   and a per-session binary "sshd-session". This allows for a much
   smaller listener binary, as it no longer needs to support the SSH
   protocol. As part of this work, support for disabling privilege
   separation (which previously required code changes to disable) and
   disabling re-execution of sshd(8) has been removed. Further
   separation of sshd-session into additional, minimal binaries is
   planned for the future.

 * sshd(8): several log messages have changed. In particular, some
   log messages will be tagged with as originating from a process
   named "sshd-session" rather than "sshd".

 * ssh-keyscan(1): this tool previously emitted comment lines
   containing the hostname and SSH protocol banner to standard error.
   This release now emits them to standard output, but adds a new
   "-q" flag to silence them altogether.

 * sshd(8): (portable OpenSSH only) sshd will no longer use argv[0]
   as the PAM service name. A new "PAMServiceName" sshd_config(5)
   directive allows selecting the service name at runtime. This
   defaults to "sshd". bz2101

New features
------------

 * sshd(8): sshd(8) will now penalise client addresses that, for various
   reasons, do not successfully complete authentication. This feature is
   controlled by a new sshd_config(5) PerSourcePenalties option and is
   on by default.

 * ssh(8): allow the HostkeyAlgorithms directive to disable the
   implicit fallback from certificate host key to plain host keys.

Portability
-----------

 * sshd(8): expose SSH_AUTH_INFO_0 always to PAM auth modules
   unconditionally. The previous behaviour was to expose it only when
   particular authentication methods were in use.

 * ssh(1), ssh-agent(8): allow the presence of the WAYLAND_DISPLAY
   environment variable to enable SSH_ASKPASS, similarly to the X11
   DISPLAY environment variable. GHPR479

---

Sponsored by:	The FreeBSD Foundation
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D48914

(cherry picked from commit 0fdf8fae8b569bf9fff3b5171e669dcd7cf9c79e)
(cherry picked from commit b4bb480ae9294d7e4b375f0ead9ae57517c79ef3)
(cherry picked from commit e95979047aec384852102cf8bb1d55278ea77eeb)
(cherry picked from commit dcb4ae528d357f34e4a4b4882c2757c67c98e395)

Approved by:	re (accelerated MFC)

(cherry picked from commit ff2fd01609cc10bcdc87ebe4de42efaf7ffe2ee9)

3 files changed, 5 insertions, 12 deletions

diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/agent_fuzz_helper.c b/crypto/openssh/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/agent_fuzz_helper.c
index c3051c72b8db..321343bbbbdc 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/agent_fuzz_helper.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/agent_fuzz_helper.c
@@ -112,7 +112,6 @@ reset_idtab(void)
 	idtab_init();
 	// Load keys.
 	add_key(PRIV_RSA, CERT_RSA);
-	add_key(PRIV_DSA, CERT_DSA);
 	add_key(PRIV_ECDSA, CERT_ECDSA);
 	add_key(PRIV_ED25519, CERT_ED25519);
 	add_key(PRIV_ECDSA_SK, CERT_ECDSA_SK);
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/kex_fuzz.cc b/crypto/openssh/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/kex_fuzz.cc
index d38ca8597072..f126d93f69de 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/kex_fuzz.cc
+++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/kex_fuzz.cc
@@ -144,7 +144,6 @@ static int
 prepare_keys(struct shared_state *st)
 {
 	if (prepare_key(st, KEY_RSA, 2048) != 0 ||
-	    prepare_key(st, KEY_DSA, 1024) != 0 ||
 	    prepare_key(st, KEY_ECDSA, 256) != 0 ||
 	    prepare_key(st, KEY_ED25519, 256) != 0) {
 		error_f("key prepare failed");
@@ -264,10 +263,6 @@ prepare_key(struct shared_state *st, int kt, int bits)
 		pubstr = PUB_RSA;
 		privstr = PRIV_RSA;
 		break;
-	case KEY_DSA:
-		pubstr = PUB_DSA;
-		privstr = PRIV_DSA;
-		break;
 	case KEY_ECDSA:
 		pubstr = PUB_ECDSA;
 		privstr = PRIV_ECDSA;
@@ -325,7 +320,7 @@ int main(void)
 {
 	static struct shared_state *st;
 	struct test_state *ts;
-	const int keytypes[] = { KEY_RSA, KEY_DSA, KEY_ECDSA, KEY_ED25519, -1 };
+	const int keytypes[] = { KEY_RSA, KEY_ECDSA, KEY_ED25519, -1 };
 	static const char * const kextypes[] = {
 		"sntrup761x25519-sha512@openssh.com",
 		"curve25519-sha256@libssh.org",
@@ -399,7 +394,6 @@ static void
 do_kex(struct shared_state *st, struct test_state *ts, const char *kex)
 {
 	do_kex_with_key(st, ts, kex, KEY_RSA);
-	do_kex_with_key(st, ts, kex, KEY_DSA);
 	do_kex_with_key(st, ts, kex, KEY_ECDSA);
 	do_kex_with_key(st, ts, kex, KEY_ED25519);
 }
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/sig_fuzz.cc b/crypto/openssh/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/sig_fuzz.cc
index b32502ba023f..639e4d227ff7 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/sig_fuzz.cc
+++ b/crypto/openssh/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/sig_fuzz.cc
@@ -26,7 +26,6 @@ int LLVMFuzzerTestOneInput(const uint8_t* sig, size_t slen)
 {
 #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
   static struct sshkey *rsa = generate_or_die(KEY_RSA, 2048);
-  static struct sshkey *dsa = generate_or_die(KEY_DSA, 1024);
   static struct sshkey *ecdsa256 = generate_or_die(KEY_ECDSA, 256);
   static struct sshkey *ecdsa384 = generate_or_die(KEY_ECDSA, 384);
   static struct sshkey *ecdsa521 = generate_or_die(KEY_ECDSA, 521);
@@ -41,19 +40,20 @@ int LLVMFuzzerTestOneInput(const uint8_t* sig, size_t slen)
   sshkey_verify(rsa, sig, slen, (const u_char *)data, dlen, NULL, 0, &details);
   sshkey_sig_details_free(details);
   details = NULL;
-  sshkey_verify(dsa, sig, slen, (const u_char *)data, dlen, NULL, 0, &details);
-  sshkey_sig_details_free(details);
-  details = NULL;
+
   sshkey_verify(ecdsa256, sig, slen, (const u_char *)data, dlen, NULL, 0, &details);
   sshkey_sig_details_free(details);
   details = NULL;
+
   sshkey_verify(ecdsa384, sig, slen, (const u_char *)data, dlen, NULL, 0, &details);
   sshkey_sig_details_free(details);
   details = NULL;
+
   sshkey_verify(ecdsa521, sig, slen, (const u_char *)data, dlen, NULL, 0, &details);
   sshkey_sig_details_free(details);
   details = NULL;
 #endif
+
   sshkey_verify(ed25519, sig, slen, (const u_char *)data, dlen, NULL, 0, &details);
   sshkey_sig_details_free(details);
   return 0;