diff options
author | Ed Maste <emaste@FreeBSD.org> | 2018-10-06 14:38:34 +0000 |
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committer | Ed Maste <emaste@FreeBSD.org> | 2018-10-06 14:38:34 +0000 |
commit | 2a01feabb3d0fce30c4a1c4b883e50e09a457a96 (patch) | |
tree | 1f25fe87d5a64852c654279bc8338bf7f6f08fbf /crypto/openssh/dh.c | |
parent | 013cc176c90a5f684eea8ec5cceee04af57ea8b9 (diff) | |
parent | 0a5cc6b21cce53f048784a6aee0cc78fb5b57946 (diff) |
openssh: cherry-pick OpenSSL 1.1.1 compatibility
Compatibility with existing OpenSSL versions is maintained.
Upstream commits:
482d23bcac upstream: hold our collective noses and use the openssl-1.1.x
48f54b9d12 adapt -portable to OpenSSL 1.1x API
86e0a9f3d2 upstream: use only openssl-1.1.x API here too
a3fd8074e2 upstream: missed a bit of openssl-1.0.x API in this unittest
cce8cbe0ed Fix openssl-1.1 fallout for --without-openssl.
Trivial conflicts in sshkey.c and test_sshkey.c were resolved.
Connect libressl-api-compat.c to the build, and regenerate config.h
Reviewed by: des
Approved by: re (rgrimes)
MFC after: 2 seeks
Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D17444
Notes
Notes:
svn path=/head/; revision=339213
Diffstat (limited to 'crypto/openssh/dh.c')
-rw-r--r-- | crypto/openssh/dh.c | 62 |
1 files changed, 39 insertions, 23 deletions
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/dh.c b/crypto/openssh/dh.c index ac8d5a0ae673..f3ed388290db 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/dh.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/dh.c @@ -43,6 +43,8 @@ #include "misc.h" #include "ssherr.h" +#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h" + static int parse_prime(int linenum, char *line, struct dhgroup *dhg) { @@ -216,14 +218,17 @@ choose_dh(int min, int wantbits, int max) /* diffie-hellman-groupN-sha1 */ int -dh_pub_is_valid(DH *dh, BIGNUM *dh_pub) +dh_pub_is_valid(const DH *dh, const BIGNUM *dh_pub) { int i; int n = BN_num_bits(dh_pub); int bits_set = 0; BIGNUM *tmp; + const BIGNUM *dh_p; + + DH_get0_pqg(dh, &dh_p, NULL, NULL); - if (dh_pub->neg) { + if (BN_is_negative(dh_pub)) { logit("invalid public DH value: negative"); return 0; } @@ -236,7 +241,7 @@ dh_pub_is_valid(DH *dh, BIGNUM *dh_pub) error("%s: BN_new failed", __func__); return 0; } - if (!BN_sub(tmp, dh->p, BN_value_one()) || + if (!BN_sub(tmp, dh_p, BN_value_one()) || BN_cmp(dh_pub, tmp) != -1) { /* pub_exp > p-2 */ BN_clear_free(tmp); logit("invalid public DH value: >= p-1"); @@ -247,14 +252,14 @@ dh_pub_is_valid(DH *dh, BIGNUM *dh_pub) for (i = 0; i <= n; i++) if (BN_is_bit_set(dh_pub, i)) bits_set++; - debug2("bits set: %d/%d", bits_set, BN_num_bits(dh->p)); + debug2("bits set: %d/%d", bits_set, BN_num_bits(dh_p)); /* * if g==2 and bits_set==1 then computing log_g(dh_pub) is trivial */ if (bits_set < 4) { logit("invalid public DH value (%d/%d)", - bits_set, BN_num_bits(dh->p)); + bits_set, BN_num_bits(dh_p)); return 0; } return 1; @@ -264,9 +269,12 @@ int dh_gen_key(DH *dh, int need) { int pbits; + const BIGNUM *dh_p, *pub_key; - if (need < 0 || dh->p == NULL || - (pbits = BN_num_bits(dh->p)) <= 0 || + DH_get0_pqg(dh, &dh_p, NULL, NULL); + + if (need < 0 || dh_p == NULL || + (pbits = BN_num_bits(dh_p)) <= 0 || need > INT_MAX / 2 || 2 * need > pbits) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; if (need < 256) @@ -275,13 +283,14 @@ dh_gen_key(DH *dh, int need) * Pollard Rho, Big step/Little Step attacks are O(sqrt(n)), * so double requested need here. */ - dh->length = MINIMUM(need * 2, pbits - 1); - if (DH_generate_key(dh) == 0 || - !dh_pub_is_valid(dh, dh->pub_key)) { - BN_clear_free(dh->priv_key); - dh->priv_key = NULL; + if (!DH_set_length(dh, MINIMUM(need * 2, pbits - 1))) return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; - } + + if (DH_generate_key(dh) == 0) + return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; + DH_get0_key(dh, &pub_key, NULL); + if (!dh_pub_is_valid(dh, pub_key)) + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; return 0; } @@ -289,22 +298,27 @@ DH * dh_new_group_asc(const char *gen, const char *modulus) { DH *dh; + BIGNUM *dh_p = NULL, *dh_g = NULL; if ((dh = DH_new()) == NULL) return NULL; - if (BN_hex2bn(&dh->p, modulus) == 0 || - BN_hex2bn(&dh->g, gen) == 0) { - DH_free(dh); - return NULL; - } - return (dh); + if (BN_hex2bn(&dh_p, modulus) == 0 || + BN_hex2bn(&dh_g, gen) == 0) + goto fail; + if (!DH_set0_pqg(dh, dh_p, NULL, dh_g)) + goto fail; + return dh; + fail: + DH_free(dh); + BN_clear_free(dh_p); + BN_clear_free(dh_g); + return NULL; } /* * This just returns the group, we still need to generate the exchange * value. */ - DH * dh_new_group(BIGNUM *gen, BIGNUM *modulus) { @@ -312,10 +326,12 @@ dh_new_group(BIGNUM *gen, BIGNUM *modulus) if ((dh = DH_new()) == NULL) return NULL; - dh->p = modulus; - dh->g = gen; + if (!DH_set0_pqg(dh, modulus, NULL, gen)) { + DH_free(dh); + return NULL; + } - return (dh); + return dh; } /* rfc2409 "Second Oakley Group" (1024 bits) */ |