Vendor import of Unbound 1.6.8.vendor/unbound/1.6.8

25 files changed, 183 insertions, 96 deletions

diff --git a/aclocal.m4 b/aclocal.m4
index d1c7555a8d1c..002c4723b6b2 100644
--- a/aclocal.m4
+++ b/aclocal.m4
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
-# generated automatically by aclocal 1.15 -*- Autoconf -*-
+# generated automatically by aclocal 1.15.1 -*- Autoconf -*-
 
-# Copyright (C) 1996-2014 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+# Copyright (C) 1996-2017 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
 
 # This file is free software; the Free Software Foundation
 # gives unlimited permission to copy and/or distribute it,
@@ -9390,7 +9390,7 @@ AS_IF([test "$AS_TR_SH([with_]m4_tolower([$1]))" = "yes"],
 
 # AM_CONDITIONAL                                            -*- Autoconf -*-
 
-# Copyright (C) 1997-2014 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+# Copyright (C) 1997-2017 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
 #
 # This file is free software; the Free Software Foundation
 # gives unlimited permission to copy and/or distribute it,
@@ -9421,7 +9421,7 @@ AC_CONFIG_COMMANDS_PRE(
 Usually this means the macro was only invoked conditionally.]])
 fi])])
 
-# Copyright (C) 2006-2014 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+# Copyright (C) 2006-2017 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
 #
 # This file is free software; the Free Software Foundation
 # gives unlimited permission to copy and/or distribute it,
diff --git a/configure b/configure
index 796e20c727d1..96fb7eb19bab 100755
--- a/configure
+++ b/configure
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 #! /bin/sh
 # Guess values for system-dependent variables and create Makefiles.
-# Generated by GNU Autoconf 2.69 for unbound 1.6.7.
+# Generated by GNU Autoconf 2.69 for unbound 1.6.8.
 #
 # Report bugs to <unbound-bugs@nlnetlabs.nl>.
 #
@@ -590,8 +590,8 @@ MAKEFLAGS=
 # Identity of this package.
 PACKAGE_NAME='unbound'
 PACKAGE_TARNAME='unbound'
-PACKAGE_VERSION='1.6.7'
-PACKAGE_STRING='unbound 1.6.7'
+PACKAGE_VERSION='1.6.8'
+PACKAGE_STRING='unbound 1.6.8'
 PACKAGE_BUGREPORT='unbound-bugs@nlnetlabs.nl'
 PACKAGE_URL=''
 
@@ -1437,7 +1437,7 @@ if test "$ac_init_help" = "long"; then
   # Omit some internal or obsolete options to make the list less imposing.
   # This message is too long to be a string in the A/UX 3.1 sh.
   cat <<_ACEOF
-\`configure' configures unbound 1.6.7 to adapt to many kinds of systems.
+\`configure' configures unbound 1.6.8 to adapt to many kinds of systems.
 
 Usage: $0 [OPTION]... [VAR=VALUE]...
 
@@ -1502,7 +1502,7 @@ fi
 
 if test -n "$ac_init_help"; then
   case $ac_init_help in
-     short | recursive ) echo "Configuration of unbound 1.6.7:";;
+     short | recursive ) echo "Configuration of unbound 1.6.8:";;
    esac
   cat <<\_ACEOF
 
@@ -1714,7 +1714,7 @@ fi
 test -n "$ac_init_help" && exit $ac_status
 if $ac_init_version; then
   cat <<\_ACEOF
-unbound configure 1.6.7
+unbound configure 1.6.8
 generated by GNU Autoconf 2.69
 
 Copyright (C) 2012 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
@@ -2423,7 +2423,7 @@ cat >config.log <<_ACEOF
 This file contains any messages produced by compilers while
 running configure, to aid debugging if configure makes a mistake.
 
-It was created by unbound $as_me 1.6.7, which was
+It was created by unbound $as_me 1.6.8, which was
 generated by GNU Autoconf 2.69.  Invocation command line was
 
   $ $0 $@
@@ -2775,11 +2775,11 @@ UNBOUND_VERSION_MAJOR=1
 
 UNBOUND_VERSION_MINOR=6
 
-UNBOUND_VERSION_MICRO=7
+UNBOUND_VERSION_MICRO=8
 
 
 LIBUNBOUND_CURRENT=7
-LIBUNBOUND_REVISION=6
+LIBUNBOUND_REVISION=7
 LIBUNBOUND_AGE=5
 # 1.0.0 had 0:12:0
 # 1.0.1 had 0:13:0
@@ -2837,6 +2837,7 @@ LIBUNBOUND_AGE=5
 # 1.6.5 had 7:4:5
 # 1.6.6 had 7:5:5
 # 1.6.7 had 7:6:5
+# 1.6.8 had 7:7:5
 
 #   Current  -- the number of the binary API that we're implementing
 #   Revision -- which iteration of the implementation of the binary
@@ -20694,7 +20695,7 @@ _ACEOF
 
 
 
-version=1.6.7
+version=1.6.8
 
 date=`date +'%b %e, %Y'`
 
@@ -21213,7 +21214,7 @@ cat >>$CONFIG_STATUS <<\_ACEOF || ac_write_fail=1
 # report actual input values of CONFIG_FILES etc. instead of their
 # values after options handling.
 ac_log="
-This file was extended by unbound $as_me 1.6.7, which was
+This file was extended by unbound $as_me 1.6.8, which was
 generated by GNU Autoconf 2.69.  Invocation command line was
 
   CONFIG_FILES    = $CONFIG_FILES
@@ -21279,7 +21280,7 @@ _ACEOF
 cat >>$CONFIG_STATUS <<_ACEOF || ac_write_fail=1
 ac_cs_config="`$as_echo "$ac_configure_args" | sed 's/^ //; s/[\\""\`\$]/\\\\&/g'`"
 ac_cs_version="\\
-unbound config.status 1.6.7
+unbound config.status 1.6.8
 configured by $0, generated by GNU Autoconf 2.69,
   with options \\"\$ac_cs_config\\"
 
diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
index 730ac383c240..5c2059ed793f 100644
--- a/configure.ac
+++ b/configure.ac
@@ -11,14 +11,14 @@ sinclude(dnscrypt/dnscrypt.m4)
 # must be numbers. ac_defun because of later processing
 m4_define([VERSION_MAJOR],[1])
 m4_define([VERSION_MINOR],[6])
-m4_define([VERSION_MICRO],[7])
+m4_define([VERSION_MICRO],[8])
 AC_INIT(unbound, m4_defn([VERSION_MAJOR]).m4_defn([VERSION_MINOR]).m4_defn([VERSION_MICRO]), unbound-bugs@nlnetlabs.nl, unbound)
 AC_SUBST(UNBOUND_VERSION_MAJOR, [VERSION_MAJOR])
 AC_SUBST(UNBOUND_VERSION_MINOR, [VERSION_MINOR])
 AC_SUBST(UNBOUND_VERSION_MICRO, [VERSION_MICRO])
 
 LIBUNBOUND_CURRENT=7
-LIBUNBOUND_REVISION=6
+LIBUNBOUND_REVISION=7
 LIBUNBOUND_AGE=5
 # 1.0.0 had 0:12:0
 # 1.0.1 had 0:13:0
@@ -76,6 +76,7 @@ LIBUNBOUND_AGE=5
 # 1.6.5 had 7:4:5
 # 1.6.6 had 7:5:5
 # 1.6.7 had 7:6:5
+# 1.6.8 had 7:7:5
 
 #   Current  -- the number of the binary API that we're implementing
 #   Revision -- which iteration of the implementation of the binary
diff --git a/doc/Changelog b/doc/Changelog
index 3a03d6888810..5c6be3ada8b7 100644
--- a/doc/Changelog
+++ b/doc/Changelog
@@ -1,3 +1,7 @@
+19 January 2018: Wouter 
+	- patch for CVE-2017-15105: vulnerability in the processing of
+	  wildcard synthesized NSEC records.
+
 10 October 2017: Wouter 
 	- tag 1.6.7
 
diff --git a/doc/README b/doc/README
index 6d8cc2ef8a28..d3bea2e0bab2 100644
--- a/doc/README
+++ b/doc/README
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-README for Unbound 1.6.7
+README for Unbound 1.6.8
 Copyright 2007 NLnet Labs
 http://unbound.net
 
diff --git a/doc/example.conf.in b/doc/example.conf.in
index e636dc858201..b18513600700 100644
--- a/doc/example.conf.in
+++ b/doc/example.conf.in
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 #
 # Example configuration file.
 #
-# See unbound.conf(5) man page, version 1.6.7.
+# See unbound.conf(5) man page, version 1.6.8.
 #
 # this is a comment.
 
diff --git a/doc/libunbound.3.in b/doc/libunbound.3.in
index 7dd8de65273b..0b8ca2afe32c 100644
--- a/doc/libunbound.3.in
+++ b/doc/libunbound.3.in
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-.TH "libunbound" "3" "Oct 10, 2017" "NLnet Labs" "unbound 1.6.7"
+.TH "libunbound" "3" "Jan 19, 2018" "NLnet Labs" "unbound 1.6.8"
 .\"
 .\" libunbound.3 -- unbound library functions manual
 .\"
@@ -43,7 +43,7 @@
 .B ub_ctx_zone_remove,
 .B ub_ctx_data_add,
 .B ub_ctx_data_remove
-\- Unbound DNS validating resolver 1.6.7 functions.
+\- Unbound DNS validating resolver 1.6.8 functions.
 .SH "SYNOPSIS"
 .B #include <unbound.h>
 .LP
diff --git a/doc/unbound-anchor.8.in b/doc/unbound-anchor.8.in
index 1e07f5e2b839..093b75aa7cd3 100644
--- a/doc/unbound-anchor.8.in
+++ b/doc/unbound-anchor.8.in
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-.TH "unbound-anchor" "8" "Oct 10, 2017" "NLnet Labs" "unbound 1.6.7"
+.TH "unbound-anchor" "8" "Jan 19, 2018" "NLnet Labs" "unbound 1.6.8"
 .\"
 .\" unbound-anchor.8 -- unbound anchor maintenance utility manual
 .\"
diff --git a/doc/unbound-checkconf.8.in b/doc/unbound-checkconf.8.in
index 3a7e1e98a465..bfc55bdc0919 100644
--- a/doc/unbound-checkconf.8.in
+++ b/doc/unbound-checkconf.8.in
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-.TH "unbound-checkconf" "8" "Oct 10, 2017" "NLnet Labs" "unbound 1.6.7"
+.TH "unbound-checkconf" "8" "Jan 19, 2018" "NLnet Labs" "unbound 1.6.8"
 .\"
 .\" unbound-checkconf.8 -- unbound configuration checker manual
 .\"
diff --git a/doc/unbound-control.8.in b/doc/unbound-control.8.in
index 80501a7227fb..24e5ce23ad1d 100644
--- a/doc/unbound-control.8.in
+++ b/doc/unbound-control.8.in
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-.TH "unbound-control" "8" "Oct 10, 2017" "NLnet Labs" "unbound 1.6.7"
+.TH "unbound-control" "8" "Jan 19, 2018" "NLnet Labs" "unbound 1.6.8"
 .\"
 .\" unbound-control.8 -- unbound remote control manual
 .\"
diff --git a/doc/unbound-host.1.in b/doc/unbound-host.1.in
index b16363c5d536..42e6096ef597 100644
--- a/doc/unbound-host.1.in
+++ b/doc/unbound-host.1.in
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-.TH "unbound\-host" "1" "Oct 10, 2017" "NLnet Labs" "unbound 1.6.7"
+.TH "unbound\-host" "1" "Jan 19, 2018" "NLnet Labs" "unbound 1.6.8"
 .\"
 .\" unbound-host.1 -- unbound DNS lookup utility
 .\"
diff --git a/doc/unbound.8.in b/doc/unbound.8.in
index 1f70ef6685f9..1e2adb1ea53d 100644
--- a/doc/unbound.8.in
+++ b/doc/unbound.8.in
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-.TH "unbound" "8" "Oct 10, 2017" "NLnet Labs" "unbound 1.6.7"
+.TH "unbound" "8" "Jan 19, 2018" "NLnet Labs" "unbound 1.6.8"
 .\"
 .\" unbound.8 -- unbound manual
 .\"
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@
 .\"
 .SH "NAME"
 .B unbound
-\- Unbound DNS validating resolver 1.6.7.
+\- Unbound DNS validating resolver 1.6.8.
 .SH "SYNOPSIS"
 .B unbound
 .RB [ \-h ]
diff --git a/doc/unbound.conf.5.in b/doc/unbound.conf.5.in
index 73c4db9561d6..f6e53111d2d9 100644
--- a/doc/unbound.conf.5.in
+++ b/doc/unbound.conf.5.in
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-.TH "unbound.conf" "5" "Oct 10, 2017" "NLnet Labs" "unbound 1.6.7"
+.TH "unbound.conf" "5" "Jan 19, 2018" "NLnet Labs" "unbound 1.6.8"
 .\"
 .\" unbound.conf.5 -- unbound.conf manual
 .\"
diff --git a/testcode/unitverify.c b/testcode/unitverify.c
index e421d90bca56..eec11df60778 100644
--- a/testcode/unitverify.c
+++ b/testcode/unitverify.c
@@ -186,7 +186,9 @@ verifytest_rrset(struct module_env* env, struct val_env* ve,
 			ntohs(rrset->rk.rrset_class));
 	}
 	setup_sigalg(dnskey, sigalg); /* check all algorithms in the dnskey */
-	sec = dnskeyset_verify_rrset(env, ve, rrset, dnskey, sigalg, &reason);
+	/* ok to give null as qstate here, won't be used for answer section. */
+	sec = dnskeyset_verify_rrset(env, ve, rrset, dnskey, sigalg, &reason,
+		LDNS_SECTION_ANSWER, NULL);
 	if(vsig) {
 		printf("verify outcome is: %s %s\n", sec_status_to_string(sec),
 			reason?reason:"");
diff --git a/validator/autotrust.c b/validator/autotrust.c
index 97c3e3cc3691..7bc5577f4f65 100644
--- a/validator/autotrust.c
+++ b/validator/autotrust.c
@@ -1227,17 +1227,20 @@ void autr_write_file(struct module_env* env, struct trust_anchor* tp)
  * @param ve: validator environment (with options) for verification.
  * @param tp: trust point to verify with
  * @param rrset: DNSKEY rrset to verify.
+ * @param qstate: qstate with region.
  * @return false on failure, true if verification successful.
  */
 static int
 verify_dnskey(struct module_env* env, struct val_env* ve,
-        struct trust_anchor* tp, struct ub_packed_rrset_key* rrset)
+        struct trust_anchor* tp, struct ub_packed_rrset_key* rrset,
+	struct module_qstate* qstate)
 {
 	char* reason = NULL;
 	uint8_t sigalg[ALGO_NEEDS_MAX+1];
 	int downprot = env->cfg->harden_algo_downgrade;
 	enum sec_status sec = val_verify_DNSKEY_with_TA(env, ve, rrset,
-		tp->ds_rrset, tp->dnskey_rrset, downprot?sigalg:NULL, &reason);
+		tp->ds_rrset, tp->dnskey_rrset, downprot?sigalg:NULL, &reason,
+		qstate);
 	/* sigalg is ignored, it returns algorithms signalled to exist, but
 	 * in 5011 there are no other rrsets to check.  if downprot is
 	 * enabled, then it checks that the DNSKEY is signed with all
@@ -1276,7 +1279,8 @@ min_expiry(struct module_env* env, struct packed_rrset_data* dd)
 /** Is rr self-signed revoked key */
 static int
 rr_is_selfsigned_revoked(struct module_env* env, struct val_env* ve,
-	struct ub_packed_rrset_key* dnskey_rrset, size_t i)
+	struct ub_packed_rrset_key* dnskey_rrset, size_t i,
+	struct module_qstate* qstate)
 {
 	enum sec_status sec;
 	char* reason = NULL;
@@ -1285,7 +1289,7 @@ rr_is_selfsigned_revoked(struct module_env* env, struct val_env* ve,
 	/* no algorithm downgrade protection necessary, if it is selfsigned
 	 * revoked it can be removed. */
 	sec = dnskey_verify_rrset(env, ve, dnskey_rrset, dnskey_rrset, i, 
-		&reason);
+		&reason, LDNS_SECTION_ANSWER, qstate);
 	return (sec == sec_status_secure);
 }
 
@@ -1501,7 +1505,7 @@ init_events(struct trust_anchor* tp)
 static void
 check_contains_revoked(struct module_env* env, struct val_env* ve,
 	struct trust_anchor* tp, struct ub_packed_rrset_key* dnskey_rrset,
-	int* changed)
+	int* changed, struct module_qstate* qstate)
 {
 	struct packed_rrset_data* dd = (struct packed_rrset_data*)
 		dnskey_rrset->entry.data;
@@ -1521,7 +1525,7 @@ check_contains_revoked(struct module_env* env, struct val_env* ve,
 		}
 		if(!ta)
 			continue; /* key not found */
-		if(rr_is_selfsigned_revoked(env, ve, dnskey_rrset, i)) {
+		if(rr_is_selfsigned_revoked(env, ve, dnskey_rrset, i, qstate)) {
 			/* checked if there is an rrsig signed by this key. */
 			/* same keytag, but stored can be revoked already, so 
 			 * compare keytags, with +0 or +128(REVOKE flag) */
@@ -2118,7 +2122,8 @@ autr_tp_remove(struct module_env* env, struct trust_anchor* tp,
 }
 
 int autr_process_prime(struct module_env* env, struct val_env* ve,
-	struct trust_anchor* tp, struct ub_packed_rrset_key* dnskey_rrset)
+	struct trust_anchor* tp, struct ub_packed_rrset_key* dnskey_rrset,
+	struct module_qstate* qstate)
 {
 	int changed = 0;
 	log_assert(tp && tp->autr);
@@ -2159,7 +2164,7 @@ int autr_process_prime(struct module_env* env, struct val_env* ve,
 		return 1; /* trust point exists */
 	}
 	/* check for revoked keys to remove immediately */
-	check_contains_revoked(env, ve, tp, dnskey_rrset, &changed);
+	check_contains_revoked(env, ve, tp, dnskey_rrset, &changed, qstate);
 	if(changed) {
 		verbose(VERB_ALGO, "autotrust: revokedkeys, reassemble");
 		if(!autr_assemble(tp)) {
@@ -2175,7 +2180,7 @@ int autr_process_prime(struct module_env* env, struct val_env* ve,
 		}
 	}
 	/* verify the dnskey rrset and see if it is valid. */
-	if(!verify_dnskey(env, ve, tp, dnskey_rrset)) {
+	if(!verify_dnskey(env, ve, tp, dnskey_rrset, qstate)) {
 		verbose(VERB_ALGO, "autotrust: dnskey did not verify.");
 		/* only increase failure count if this is not the first prime,
 		 * this means there was a previous successful probe */
diff --git a/validator/autotrust.h b/validator/autotrust.h
index dbaf5126a0b8..c549798f0e3c 100644
--- a/validator/autotrust.h
+++ b/validator/autotrust.h
@@ -47,6 +47,7 @@ struct val_anchors;
 struct trust_anchor;
 struct ub_packed_rrset_key;
 struct module_env;
+struct module_qstate;
 struct val_env;
 struct sldns_buffer;
 
@@ -188,12 +189,14 @@ void autr_point_delete(struct trust_anchor* tp);
  * @param tp: trust anchor to process.
  * @param dnskey_rrset: DNSKEY rrset probed (can be NULL if bad prime result).
  * 	allocated in a region. Has not been validated yet.
+ * @param qstate: qstate with region.
  * @return false if trust anchor was revoked completely.
  * 	Otherwise logs errors to log, does not change return value.
  * 	On errors, likely the trust point has been unchanged.
  */
 int autr_process_prime(struct module_env* env, struct val_env* ve,
-	struct trust_anchor* tp, struct ub_packed_rrset_key* dnskey_rrset);
+	struct trust_anchor* tp, struct ub_packed_rrset_key* dnskey_rrset,
+	struct module_qstate* qstate);
 
 /**
  * Debug printout of rfc5011 tracked anchors
diff --git a/validator/val_nsec.c b/validator/val_nsec.c
index 1e4f440ffc09..4604f3d6d423 100644
--- a/validator/val_nsec.c
+++ b/validator/val_nsec.c
@@ -176,7 +176,7 @@ val_nsec_proves_no_ds(struct ub_packed_rrset_key* nsec,
 static int
 nsec_verify_rrset(struct module_env* env, struct val_env* ve, 
 	struct ub_packed_rrset_key* nsec, struct key_entry_key* kkey, 
-	char** reason)
+	char** reason, struct module_qstate* qstate)
 {
 	struct packed_rrset_data* d = (struct packed_rrset_data*)
 		nsec->entry.data;
@@ -185,7 +185,8 @@ nsec_verify_rrset(struct module_env* env, struct val_env* ve,
 	rrset_check_sec_status(env->rrset_cache, nsec, *env->now);
 	if(d->security == sec_status_secure)
 		return 1;
-	d->security = val_verify_rrset_entry(env, ve, nsec, kkey, reason);
+	d->security = val_verify_rrset_entry(env, ve, nsec, kkey, reason,
+		LDNS_SECTION_AUTHORITY, qstate);
 	if(d->security == sec_status_secure) {
 		rrset_update_sec_status(env->rrset_cache, nsec, *env->now);
 		return 1;
@@ -196,7 +197,8 @@ nsec_verify_rrset(struct module_env* env, struct val_env* ve,
 enum sec_status 
 val_nsec_prove_nodata_dsreply(struct module_env* env, struct val_env* ve, 
 	struct query_info* qinfo, struct reply_info* rep, 
-	struct key_entry_key* kkey, time_t* proof_ttl, char** reason)
+	struct key_entry_key* kkey, time_t* proof_ttl, char** reason,
+	struct module_qstate* qstate)
 {
 	struct ub_packed_rrset_key* nsec = reply_find_rrset_section_ns(
 		rep, qinfo->qname, qinfo->qname_len, LDNS_RR_TYPE_NSEC, 
@@ -213,7 +215,7 @@ val_nsec_prove_nodata_dsreply(struct module_env* env, struct val_env* ve,
 	 * 1) this is a delegation point and there is no DS
 	 * 2) this is not a delegation point */
 	if(nsec) {
-		if(!nsec_verify_rrset(env, ve, nsec, kkey, reason)) {
+		if(!nsec_verify_rrset(env, ve, nsec, kkey, reason, qstate)) {
 			verbose(VERB_ALGO, "NSEC RRset for the "
 				"referral did not verify.");
 			return sec_status_bogus;
@@ -242,7 +244,8 @@ val_nsec_prove_nodata_dsreply(struct module_env* env, struct val_env* ve,
 		i++) {
 		if(rep->rrsets[i]->rk.type != htons(LDNS_RR_TYPE_NSEC))
 			continue;
-		if(!nsec_verify_rrset(env, ve, rep->rrsets[i], kkey, reason)) {
+		if(!nsec_verify_rrset(env, ve, rep->rrsets[i], kkey, reason,
+			qstate)) {
 			verbose(VERB_ALGO, "NSEC for empty non-terminal "
 				"did not verify.");
 			return sec_status_bogus;
diff --git a/validator/val_nsec.h b/validator/val_nsec.h
index c031c9a3b853..4e71257bc35a 100644
--- a/validator/val_nsec.h
+++ b/validator/val_nsec.h
@@ -46,6 +46,7 @@
 #include "util/data/packed_rrset.h"
 struct val_env;
 struct module_env;
+struct module_qstate;
 struct ub_packed_rrset_key;
 struct reply_info;
 struct query_info;
@@ -64,6 +65,7 @@ struct key_entry_key;
  * @param kkey: key entry to use for verification of signatures.
  * @param proof_ttl: if secure, the TTL of how long this proof lasts.
  * @param reason: string explaining why bogus.
+ * @param qstate: qstate with region.
  * @return security status.
  *	SECURE: proved absence of DS.
  *	INSECURE: proved that this was not a delegation point.
@@ -73,7 +75,7 @@ struct key_entry_key;
 enum sec_status val_nsec_prove_nodata_dsreply(struct module_env* env,
 	struct val_env* ve, struct query_info* qinfo, 
 	struct reply_info* rep, struct key_entry_key* kkey,
-	time_t* proof_ttl, char** reason);
+	time_t* proof_ttl, char** reason, struct module_qstate* qstate);
 
 /** 
  * nsec typemap check, takes an NSEC-type bitmap as argument, checks for type.
diff --git a/validator/val_nsec3.c b/validator/val_nsec3.c
index e31834a44558..773ed30cde5d 100644
--- a/validator/val_nsec3.c
+++ b/validator/val_nsec3.c
@@ -1285,7 +1285,7 @@ nsec3_prove_wildcard(struct module_env* env, struct val_env* ve,
 static int
 list_is_secure(struct module_env* env, struct val_env* ve, 
 	struct ub_packed_rrset_key** list, size_t num,
-	struct key_entry_key* kkey, char** reason)
+	struct key_entry_key* kkey, char** reason, struct module_qstate* qstate)
 {
 	struct packed_rrset_data* d;
 	size_t i;
@@ -1299,7 +1299,7 @@ list_is_secure(struct module_env* env, struct val_env* ve,
 		if(d->security == sec_status_secure)
 			continue;
 		d->security = val_verify_rrset_entry(env, ve, list[i], kkey,
-			reason);
+			reason, LDNS_SECTION_AUTHORITY, qstate);
 		if(d->security != sec_status_secure) {
 			verbose(VERB_ALGO, "NSEC3 did not verify");
 			return 0;
@@ -1312,7 +1312,8 @@ list_is_secure(struct module_env* env, struct val_env* ve,
 enum sec_status
 nsec3_prove_nods(struct module_env* env, struct val_env* ve,
 	struct ub_packed_rrset_key** list, size_t num,
-	struct query_info* qinfo, struct key_entry_key* kkey, char** reason)
+	struct query_info* qinfo, struct key_entry_key* kkey, char** reason,
+	struct module_qstate* qstate)
 {
 	rbtree_type ct;
 	struct nsec3_filter flt;
@@ -1325,7 +1326,7 @@ nsec3_prove_nods(struct module_env* env, struct val_env* ve,
 		*reason = "no valid NSEC3s";
 		return sec_status_bogus; /* no valid NSEC3s, bogus */
 	}
-	if(!list_is_secure(env, ve, list, num, kkey, reason))
+	if(!list_is_secure(env, ve, list, num, kkey, reason, qstate))
 		return sec_status_bogus; /* not all NSEC3 records secure */
 	rbtree_init(&ct, &nsec3_hash_cmp); /* init names-to-hash cache */
 	filter_init(&flt, list, num, qinfo); /* init RR iterator */
diff --git a/validator/val_nsec3.h b/validator/val_nsec3.h
index 27e9f9eac192..7fd37c169052 100644
--- a/validator/val_nsec3.h
+++ b/validator/val_nsec3.h
@@ -71,6 +71,7 @@
 struct val_env;
 struct regional;
 struct module_env;
+struct module_qstate;
 struct ub_packed_rrset_key;
 struct reply_info;
 struct query_info;
@@ -185,6 +186,7 @@ nsec3_prove_wildcard(struct module_env* env, struct val_env* ve,
  * @param qinfo: query that is verified for.
  * @param kkey: key entry that signed the NSEC3s.
  * @param reason: string for bogus result.
+ * @param qstate: qstate with region.
  * @return:
  * 	sec_status SECURE of the proposition is proven by the NSEC3 RRs, 
  * 	BOGUS if not, INSECURE if all of the NSEC3s could be validly ignored.
@@ -194,7 +196,8 @@ nsec3_prove_wildcard(struct module_env* env, struct val_env* ve,
 enum sec_status
 nsec3_prove_nods(struct module_env* env, struct val_env* ve,
 	struct ub_packed_rrset_key** list, size_t num, 
-	struct query_info* qinfo, struct key_entry_key* kkey, char** reason);
+	struct query_info* qinfo, struct key_entry_key* kkey, char** reason,
+	struct module_qstate* qstate);
 
 /**
  * Prove NXDOMAIN or NODATA.
diff --git a/validator/val_sigcrypt.c b/validator/val_sigcrypt.c
index 099e658a3d2b..9987b9b3f627 100644
--- a/validator/val_sigcrypt.c
+++ b/validator/val_sigcrypt.c
@@ -485,7 +485,8 @@ int algo_needs_missing(struct algo_needs* n)
 enum sec_status 
 dnskeyset_verify_rrset(struct module_env* env, struct val_env* ve,
 	struct ub_packed_rrset_key* rrset, struct ub_packed_rrset_key* dnskey,
-	uint8_t* sigalg, char** reason)
+	uint8_t* sigalg, char** reason, sldns_pkt_section section, 
+	struct module_qstate* qstate)
 {
 	enum sec_status sec;
 	size_t i, num;
@@ -512,7 +513,7 @@ dnskeyset_verify_rrset(struct module_env* env, struct val_env* ve,
 	}
 	for(i=0; i<num; i++) {
 		sec = dnskeyset_verify_rrset_sig(env, ve, *env->now, rrset, 
-			dnskey, i, &sortree, reason);
+			dnskey, i, &sortree, reason, section, qstate);
 		/* see which algorithm has been fixed up */
 		if(sec == sec_status_secure) {
 			if(!sigalg)
@@ -553,7 +554,8 @@ void algo_needs_reason(struct module_env* env, int alg, char** reason, char* s)
 enum sec_status 
 dnskey_verify_rrset(struct module_env* env, struct val_env* ve,
         struct ub_packed_rrset_key* rrset, struct ub_packed_rrset_key* dnskey,
-	size_t dnskey_idx, char** reason)
+	size_t dnskey_idx, char** reason, sldns_pkt_section section,
+	struct module_qstate* qstate)
 {
 	enum sec_status sec;
 	size_t i, num, numchecked = 0;
@@ -577,7 +579,8 @@ dnskey_verify_rrset(struct module_env* env, struct val_env* ve,
 		buf_canon = 0;
 		sec = dnskey_verify_rrset_sig(env->scratch, 
 			env->scratch_buffer, ve, *env->now, rrset, 
-			dnskey, dnskey_idx, i, &sortree, &buf_canon, reason);
+			dnskey, dnskey_idx, i, &sortree, &buf_canon, reason,
+			section, qstate);
 		if(sec == sec_status_secure)
 			return sec;
 		numchecked ++;
@@ -591,7 +594,8 @@ enum sec_status
 dnskeyset_verify_rrset_sig(struct module_env* env, struct val_env* ve, 
 	time_t now, struct ub_packed_rrset_key* rrset, 
 	struct ub_packed_rrset_key* dnskey, size_t sig_idx, 
-	struct rbtree_type** sortree, char** reason)
+	struct rbtree_type** sortree, char** reason, sldns_pkt_section section,
+	struct module_qstate* qstate)
 {
 	/* find matching keys and check them */
 	enum sec_status sec = sec_status_bogus;
@@ -616,7 +620,7 @@ dnskeyset_verify_rrset_sig(struct module_env* env, struct val_env* ve,
 		/* see if key verifies */
 		sec = dnskey_verify_rrset_sig(env->scratch, 
 			env->scratch_buffer, ve, now, rrset, dnskey, i, 
-			sig_idx, sortree, &buf_canon, reason);
+			sig_idx, sortree, &buf_canon, reason, section, qstate);
 		if(sec == sec_status_secure)
 			return sec;
 	}
@@ -1121,12 +1125,15 @@ int rrset_canonical_equal(struct regional* region,
  * 	signer name length.
  * @param sortree: if NULL is passed a new sorted rrset tree is built.
  * 	Otherwise it is reused.
+ * @param section: section of packet where this rrset comes from.
+ * @param qstate: qstate with region.
  * @return false on alloc error.
  */
 static int
 rrset_canonical(struct regional* region, sldns_buffer* buf, 
 	struct ub_packed_rrset_key* k, uint8_t* sig, size_t siglen,
-	struct rbtree_type** sortree)
+	struct rbtree_type** sortree, sldns_pkt_section section,
+	struct module_qstate* qstate)
 {
 	struct packed_rrset_data* d = (struct packed_rrset_data*)k->entry.data;
 	uint8_t* can_owner = NULL;
@@ -1175,6 +1182,20 @@ rrset_canonical(struct regional* region, sldns_buffer* buf,
 		canonicalize_rdata(buf, k, d->rr_len[walk->rr_idx]);
 	}
 	sldns_buffer_flip(buf);
+
+	/* Replace RR owner with canonical owner for NSEC records in authority
+	 * section, to prevent that a wildcard synthesized NSEC can be used in
+	 * the non-existence proves. */
+	if(ntohs(k->rk.type) == LDNS_RR_TYPE_NSEC &&
+		section == LDNS_SECTION_AUTHORITY) {
+		k->rk.dname = regional_alloc_init(qstate->region, can_owner,
+			can_owner_len);
+		if(!k->rk.dname)
+			return 0;
+		k->rk.dname_len = can_owner_len;
+	}
+	
+
 	return 1;
 }
 
@@ -1318,7 +1339,8 @@ dnskey_verify_rrset_sig(struct regional* region, sldns_buffer* buf,
 	struct val_env* ve, time_t now,
         struct ub_packed_rrset_key* rrset, struct ub_packed_rrset_key* dnskey,
         size_t dnskey_idx, size_t sig_idx,
-	struct rbtree_type** sortree, int* buf_canon, char** reason)
+	struct rbtree_type** sortree, int* buf_canon, char** reason,
+	sldns_pkt_section section, struct module_qstate* qstate)
 {
 	enum sec_status sec;
 	uint8_t* sig;		/* RRSIG rdata */
@@ -1417,7 +1439,7 @@ dnskey_verify_rrset_sig(struct regional* region, sldns_buffer* buf,
 		/* create rrset canonical format in buffer, ready for 
 		 * signature */
 		if(!rrset_canonical(region, buf, rrset, sig+2, 
-			18 + signer_len, sortree)) {
+			18 + signer_len, sortree, section, qstate)) {
 			log_err("verify: failed due to alloc error");
 			return sec_status_unchecked;
 		}
diff --git a/validator/val_sigcrypt.h b/validator/val_sigcrypt.h
index 5a975acff4da..755a1d6e126d 100644
--- a/validator/val_sigcrypt.h
+++ b/validator/val_sigcrypt.h
@@ -44,8 +44,10 @@
 #ifndef VALIDATOR_VAL_SIGCRYPT_H
 #define VALIDATOR_VAL_SIGCRYPT_H
 #include "util/data/packed_rrset.h"
+#include "sldns/pkthdr.h"
 struct val_env;
 struct module_env;
+struct module_qstate;
 struct ub_packed_rrset_key;
 struct rbtree_type;
 struct regional;
@@ -237,13 +239,16 @@ uint16_t dnskey_get_flags(struct ub_packed_rrset_key* k, size_t idx);
  * @param sigalg: if nonNULL provide downgrade protection otherwise one
  *   algorithm is enough.
  * @param reason: if bogus, a string returned, fixed or alloced in scratch.
+ * @param section: section of packet where this rrset comes from.
+ * @param qstate: qstate with region.
  * @return SECURE if one key in the set verifies one rrsig.
  *	UNCHECKED on allocation errors, unsupported algorithms, malformed data,
  *	and BOGUS on verification failures (no keys match any signatures).
  */
 enum sec_status dnskeyset_verify_rrset(struct module_env* env, 
 	struct val_env* ve, struct ub_packed_rrset_key* rrset, 
-	struct ub_packed_rrset_key* dnskey, uint8_t* sigalg, char** reason);
+	struct ub_packed_rrset_key* dnskey, uint8_t* sigalg, char** reason,
+	sldns_pkt_section section, struct module_qstate* qstate);
 
 /** 
  * verify rrset against one specific dnskey (from rrset) 
@@ -253,12 +258,15 @@ enum sec_status dnskeyset_verify_rrset(struct module_env* env,
  * @param dnskey: DNSKEY rrset, keyset.
  * @param dnskey_idx: which key from the rrset to try.
  * @param reason: if bogus, a string returned, fixed or alloced in scratch.
+ * @param section: section of packet where this rrset comes from.
+ * @param qstate: qstate with region.
  * @return secure if *this* key signs any of the signatures on rrset.
  *	unchecked on error or and bogus on bad signature.
  */
 enum sec_status dnskey_verify_rrset(struct module_env* env, 
 	struct val_env* ve, struct ub_packed_rrset_key* rrset, 
-	struct ub_packed_rrset_key* dnskey, size_t dnskey_idx, char** reason);
+	struct ub_packed_rrset_key* dnskey, size_t dnskey_idx, char** reason,
+	sldns_pkt_section section, struct module_qstate* qstate);
 
 /** 
  * verify rrset, with dnskey rrset, for a specific rrsig in rrset
@@ -271,13 +279,16 @@ enum sec_status dnskey_verify_rrset(struct module_env* env,
  * @param sortree: reused sorted order. Stored in region. Pass NULL at start,
  * 	and for a new rrset.
  * @param reason: if bogus, a string returned, fixed or alloced in scratch.
+ * @param section: section of packet where this rrset comes from.
+ * @param qstate: qstate with region.
  * @return secure if any key signs *this* signature. bogus if no key signs it,
  *	or unchecked on error.
  */
 enum sec_status dnskeyset_verify_rrset_sig(struct module_env* env, 
 	struct val_env* ve, time_t now, struct ub_packed_rrset_key* rrset, 
 	struct ub_packed_rrset_key* dnskey, size_t sig_idx, 
-	struct rbtree_type** sortree, char** reason);
+	struct rbtree_type** sortree, char** reason, sldns_pkt_section section,
+	struct module_qstate* qstate);
 
 /** 
  * verify rrset, with specific dnskey(from set), for a specific rrsig 
@@ -295,6 +306,8 @@ enum sec_status dnskeyset_verify_rrset_sig(struct module_env* env,
  * 	pass false at start. pass old value only for same rrset and same
  * 	signature (but perhaps different key) for reuse.
  * @param reason: if bogus, a string returned, fixed or alloced in scratch.
+ * @param section: section of packet where this rrset comes from.
+ * @param qstate: qstate with region.
  * @return secure if this key signs this signature. unchecked on error or 
  *	bogus if it did not validate.
  */
@@ -302,7 +315,8 @@ enum sec_status dnskey_verify_rrset_sig(struct regional* region,
 	struct sldns_buffer* buf, struct val_env* ve, time_t now,
 	struct ub_packed_rrset_key* rrset, struct ub_packed_rrset_key* dnskey, 
 	size_t dnskey_idx, size_t sig_idx,
-	struct rbtree_type** sortree, int* buf_canon, char** reason);
+	struct rbtree_type** sortree, int* buf_canon, char** reason,
+	sldns_pkt_section section, struct module_qstate* qstate);
 
 /**
  * canonical compare for two tree entries
diff --git a/validator/val_utils.c b/validator/val_utils.c
index 973473f9dc85..0eabb7f33ba4 100644
--- a/validator/val_utils.c
+++ b/validator/val_utils.c
@@ -335,7 +335,8 @@ rrset_get_ttl(struct ub_packed_rrset_key* rrset)
 enum sec_status 
 val_verify_rrset(struct module_env* env, struct val_env* ve,
         struct ub_packed_rrset_key* rrset, struct ub_packed_rrset_key* keys,
-	uint8_t* sigalg, char** reason)
+	uint8_t* sigalg, char** reason, sldns_pkt_section section,
+	struct module_qstate* qstate)
 {
 	enum sec_status sec;
 	struct packed_rrset_data* d = (struct packed_rrset_data*)rrset->
@@ -357,7 +358,8 @@ val_verify_rrset(struct module_env* env, struct val_env* ve,
 	}
 	log_nametypeclass(VERB_ALGO, "verify rrset", rrset->rk.dname,
 		ntohs(rrset->rk.type), ntohs(rrset->rk.rrset_class));
-	sec = dnskeyset_verify_rrset(env, ve, rrset, keys, sigalg, reason);
+	sec = dnskeyset_verify_rrset(env, ve, rrset, keys, sigalg, reason,
+		section, qstate);
 	verbose(VERB_ALGO, "verify result: %s", sec_status_to_string(sec));
 	regional_free_all(env->scratch);
 
@@ -390,7 +392,7 @@ val_verify_rrset(struct module_env* env, struct val_env* ve,
 enum sec_status 
 val_verify_rrset_entry(struct module_env* env, struct val_env* ve,
         struct ub_packed_rrset_key* rrset, struct key_entry_key* kkey,
-	char** reason)
+	char** reason, sldns_pkt_section section, struct module_qstate* qstate)
 {
 	/* temporary dnskey rrset-key */
 	struct ub_packed_rrset_key dnskey;
@@ -403,7 +405,8 @@ val_verify_rrset_entry(struct module_env* env, struct val_env* ve,
 	dnskey.rk.dname_len = kkey->namelen;
 	dnskey.entry.key = &dnskey;
 	dnskey.entry.data = kd->rrset_data;
-	sec = val_verify_rrset(env, ve, rrset, &dnskey, kd->algo, reason);
+	sec = val_verify_rrset(env, ve, rrset, &dnskey, kd->algo, reason,
+		section, qstate);
 	return sec;
 }
 
@@ -411,7 +414,8 @@ val_verify_rrset_entry(struct module_env* env, struct val_env* ve,
 static enum sec_status
 verify_dnskeys_with_ds_rr(struct module_env* env, struct val_env* ve, 
 	struct ub_packed_rrset_key* dnskey_rrset, 
-        struct ub_packed_rrset_key* ds_rrset, size_t ds_idx, char** reason)
+        struct ub_packed_rrset_key* ds_rrset, size_t ds_idx, char** reason,
+	struct module_qstate* qstate)
 {
 	enum sec_status sec = sec_status_bogus;
 	size_t i, num, numchecked = 0, numhashok = 0;
@@ -442,7 +446,7 @@ verify_dnskeys_with_ds_rr(struct module_env* env, struct val_env* ve,
 		/* Otherwise, we have a match! Make sure that the DNSKEY 
 		 * verifies *with this key*  */
 		sec = dnskey_verify_rrset(env, ve, dnskey_rrset, 
-			dnskey_rrset, i, reason);
+			dnskey_rrset, i, reason, LDNS_SECTION_ANSWER, qstate);
 		if(sec == sec_status_secure) {
 			return sec;
 		}
@@ -478,7 +482,8 @@ int val_favorite_ds_algo(struct ub_packed_rrset_key* ds_rrset)
 enum sec_status 
 val_verify_DNSKEY_with_DS(struct module_env* env, struct val_env* ve,
 	struct ub_packed_rrset_key* dnskey_rrset,
-	struct ub_packed_rrset_key* ds_rrset, uint8_t* sigalg, char** reason)
+	struct ub_packed_rrset_key* ds_rrset, uint8_t* sigalg, char** reason,
+	struct module_qstate* qstate)
 {
 	/* as long as this is false, we can consider this DS rrset to be
 	 * equivalent to no DS rrset. */
@@ -520,7 +525,7 @@ val_verify_DNSKEY_with_DS(struct module_env* env, struct val_env* ve,
 		has_useful_ds = 1;
 
 		sec = verify_dnskeys_with_ds_rr(env, ve, dnskey_rrset, 
-			ds_rrset, i, reason);
+			ds_rrset, i, reason, qstate);
 		if(sec == sec_status_secure) {
 			if(!sigalg || algo_needs_set_secure(&needs,
 				(uint8_t)ds_get_key_algo(ds_rrset, i))) {
@@ -553,11 +558,12 @@ val_verify_DNSKEY_with_DS(struct module_env* env, struct val_env* ve,
 struct key_entry_key* 
 val_verify_new_DNSKEYs(struct regional* region, struct module_env* env, 
 	struct val_env* ve, struct ub_packed_rrset_key* dnskey_rrset, 
-	struct ub_packed_rrset_key* ds_rrset, int downprot, char** reason)
+	struct ub_packed_rrset_key* ds_rrset, int downprot, char** reason,
+	struct module_qstate* qstate)
 {
 	uint8_t sigalg[ALGO_NEEDS_MAX+1];
 	enum sec_status sec = val_verify_DNSKEY_with_DS(env, ve, 
-		dnskey_rrset, ds_rrset, downprot?sigalg:NULL, reason);
+		dnskey_rrset, ds_rrset, downprot?sigalg:NULL, reason, qstate);
 
 	if(sec == sec_status_secure) {
 		return key_entry_create_rrset(region, 
@@ -579,7 +585,8 @@ enum sec_status
 val_verify_DNSKEY_with_TA(struct module_env* env, struct val_env* ve,
 	struct ub_packed_rrset_key* dnskey_rrset,
 	struct ub_packed_rrset_key* ta_ds,
-	struct ub_packed_rrset_key* ta_dnskey, uint8_t* sigalg, char** reason)
+	struct ub_packed_rrset_key* ta_dnskey, uint8_t* sigalg, char** reason,
+	struct module_qstate* qstate)
 {
 	/* as long as this is false, we can consider this anchor to be
 	 * equivalent to no anchor. */
@@ -630,7 +637,7 @@ val_verify_DNSKEY_with_TA(struct module_env* env, struct val_env* ve,
 		has_useful_ta = 1;
 
 		sec = verify_dnskeys_with_ds_rr(env, ve, dnskey_rrset, 
-			ta_ds, i, reason);
+			ta_ds, i, reason, qstate);
 		if(sec == sec_status_secure) {
 			if(!sigalg || algo_needs_set_secure(&needs,
 				(uint8_t)ds_get_key_algo(ta_ds, i))) {
@@ -656,7 +663,7 @@ val_verify_DNSKEY_with_TA(struct module_env* env, struct val_env* ve,
 		has_useful_ta = 1;
 
 		sec = dnskey_verify_rrset(env, ve, dnskey_rrset,
-			ta_dnskey, i, reason);
+			ta_dnskey, i, reason, LDNS_SECTION_ANSWER, qstate);
 		if(sec == sec_status_secure) {
 			if(!sigalg || algo_needs_set_secure(&needs,
 				(uint8_t)dnskey_get_algo(ta_dnskey, i))) {
@@ -690,12 +697,12 @@ val_verify_new_DNSKEYs_with_ta(struct regional* region, struct module_env* env,
 	struct val_env* ve, struct ub_packed_rrset_key* dnskey_rrset, 
 	struct ub_packed_rrset_key* ta_ds_rrset,
 	struct ub_packed_rrset_key* ta_dnskey_rrset, int downprot,
-	char** reason)
+	char** reason, struct module_qstate* qstate)
 {
 	uint8_t sigalg[ALGO_NEEDS_MAX+1];
 	enum sec_status sec = val_verify_DNSKEY_with_TA(env, ve, 
 		dnskey_rrset, ta_ds_rrset, ta_dnskey_rrset,
-		downprot?sigalg:NULL, reason);
+		downprot?sigalg:NULL, reason, qstate);
 
 	if(sec == sec_status_secure) {
 		return key_entry_create_rrset(region, 
diff --git a/validator/val_utils.h b/validator/val_utils.h
index a837bb8912ba..b582472f8faf 100644
--- a/validator/val_utils.h
+++ b/validator/val_utils.h
@@ -42,10 +42,12 @@
 #ifndef VALIDATOR_VAL_UTILS_H
 #define VALIDATOR_VAL_UTILS_H
 #include "util/data/packed_rrset.h"
+#include "sldns/pkthdr.h"
 struct query_info;
 struct reply_info;
 struct val_env;
 struct module_env;
+struct module_qstate;
 struct ub_packed_rrset_key;
 struct key_entry_key;
 struct regional;
@@ -120,11 +122,14 @@ void val_find_signer(enum val_classification subtype,
  * @param sigalg: if nonNULL provide downgrade protection otherwise one
  *   algorithm is enough.  Algo list is constructed in here.
  * @param reason: reason of failure. Fixed string or alloced in scratch.
+ * @param section: section of packet where this rrset comes from.
+ * @param qstate: qstate with region.
  * @return security status of verification.
  */
 enum sec_status val_verify_rrset(struct module_env* env, struct val_env* ve,
 	struct ub_packed_rrset_key* rrset, struct ub_packed_rrset_key* keys,
-	uint8_t* sigalg, char** reason);
+	uint8_t* sigalg, char** reason, sldns_pkt_section section,
+	struct module_qstate* qstate);
 
 /**
  * Verify RRset with keys from a keyset.
@@ -133,11 +138,14 @@ enum sec_status val_verify_rrset(struct module_env* env, struct val_env* ve,
  * @param rrset: what to verify
  * @param kkey: key_entry to verify with.
  * @param reason: reason of failure. Fixed string or alloced in scratch.
+ * @param section: section of packet where this rrset comes from.
+ * @param qstate: qstate with region.
  * @return security status of verification.
  */
 enum sec_status val_verify_rrset_entry(struct module_env* env, 
 	struct val_env* ve, struct ub_packed_rrset_key* rrset, 
-	struct key_entry_key* kkey, char** reason);
+	struct key_entry_key* kkey, char** reason, sldns_pkt_section section,
+	struct module_qstate* qstate);
 
 /**
  * Verify DNSKEYs with DS rrset. Like val_verify_new_DNSKEYs but
@@ -150,13 +158,15 @@ enum sec_status val_verify_rrset_entry(struct module_env* env,
  *   algorithm is enough.  The list of signalled algorithms is returned,
  *   must have enough space for ALGO_NEEDS_MAX+1.
  * @param reason: reason of failure. Fixed string or alloced in scratch.
+ * @param qstate: qstate with region.
  * @return: sec_status_secure if a DS matches.
  *     sec_status_insecure if end of trust (i.e., unknown algorithms).
  *     sec_status_bogus if it fails.
  */
 enum sec_status val_verify_DNSKEY_with_DS(struct module_env* env, 
 	struct val_env* ve, struct ub_packed_rrset_key* dnskey_rrset, 
-	struct ub_packed_rrset_key* ds_rrset, uint8_t* sigalg, char** reason);
+	struct ub_packed_rrset_key* ds_rrset, uint8_t* sigalg, char** reason,
+	struct module_qstate* qstate);
 
 /**
  * Verify DNSKEYs with DS and DNSKEY rrset.  Like val_verify_DNSKEY_with_DS
@@ -170,6 +180,7 @@ enum sec_status val_verify_DNSKEY_with_DS(struct module_env* env,
  *   algorithm is enough.  The list of signalled algorithms is returned,
  *   must have enough space for ALGO_NEEDS_MAX+1.
  * @param reason: reason of failure. Fixed string or alloced in scratch.
+ * @param qstate: qstate with region.
  * @return: sec_status_secure if a DS matches.
  *     sec_status_insecure if end of trust (i.e., unknown algorithms).
  *     sec_status_bogus if it fails.
@@ -177,7 +188,8 @@ enum sec_status val_verify_DNSKEY_with_DS(struct module_env* env,
 enum sec_status val_verify_DNSKEY_with_TA(struct module_env* env, 
 	struct val_env* ve, struct ub_packed_rrset_key* dnskey_rrset, 
 	struct ub_packed_rrset_key* ta_ds,
-	struct ub_packed_rrset_key* ta_dnskey, uint8_t* sigalg, char** reason);
+	struct ub_packed_rrset_key* ta_dnskey, uint8_t* sigalg, char** reason,
+	struct module_qstate* qstate);
 
 /**
  * Verify new DNSKEYs with DS rrset. The DS contains hash values that should
@@ -192,6 +204,7 @@ enum sec_status val_verify_DNSKEY_with_TA(struct module_env* env,
  * @param downprot: if true provide downgrade protection otherwise one
  *   algorithm is enough.
  * @param reason: reason of failure. Fixed string or alloced in scratch.
+ * @param qstate: qstate with region.
  * @return a KeyEntry. This will either contain the now trusted
  *         dnskey_rrset, a "null" key entry indicating that this DS
  *         rrset/DNSKEY pair indicate an secure end to the island of trust
@@ -205,7 +218,8 @@ enum sec_status val_verify_DNSKEY_with_TA(struct module_env* env,
 struct key_entry_key* val_verify_new_DNSKEYs(struct regional* region, 
 	struct module_env* env, struct val_env* ve, 
 	struct ub_packed_rrset_key* dnskey_rrset, 
-	struct ub_packed_rrset_key* ds_rrset, int downprot, char** reason);
+	struct ub_packed_rrset_key* ds_rrset, int downprot, char** reason,
+	struct module_qstate* qstate);
 
 
 /**
@@ -220,6 +234,7 @@ struct key_entry_key* val_verify_new_DNSKEYs(struct regional* region,
  * @param downprot: if true provide downgrade protection otherwise one
  *   algorithm is enough.
  * @param reason: reason of failure. Fixed string or alloced in scratch.
+ * @param qstate: qstate with region.
  * @return a KeyEntry. This will either contain the now trusted
  *         dnskey_rrset, a "null" key entry indicating that this DS
  *         rrset/DNSKEY pair indicate an secure end to the island of trust
@@ -235,7 +250,7 @@ struct key_entry_key* val_verify_new_DNSKEYs_with_ta(struct regional* region,
 	struct ub_packed_rrset_key* dnskey_rrset, 
 	struct ub_packed_rrset_key* ta_ds_rrset, 
 	struct ub_packed_rrset_key* ta_dnskey_rrset,
-	int downprot, char** reason);
+	int downprot, char** reason, struct module_qstate* qstate);
 
 /**
  * Determine if DS rrset is usable for validator or not.
@@ -252,7 +267,7 @@ int val_dsset_isusable(struct ub_packed_rrset_key* ds_rrset);
  * the result of a wildcard expansion. If so, return the name of the
  * generating wildcard.
  * 
- * @param rrset The rrset to chedck.
+ * @param rrset The rrset to check.
  * @param wc: the wildcard name, if the rrset was synthesized from a wildcard.
  *         unchanged if not.  The wildcard name, without "*." in front, is 
  *         returned. This is a pointer into the rrset owner name.
diff --git a/validator/validator.c b/validator/validator.c
index 111cbe140353..456bffd005f3 100644
--- a/validator/validator.c
+++ b/validator/validator.c
@@ -572,7 +572,8 @@ validate_msg_signatures(struct module_qstate* qstate, struct module_env* env,
 		}
 
 		/* Verify the answer rrset */
-		sec = val_verify_rrset_entry(env, ve, s, key_entry, &reason);
+		sec = val_verify_rrset_entry(env, ve, s, key_entry, &reason,
+			LDNS_SECTION_ANSWER, qstate);
 		/* If the (answer) rrset failed to validate, then this 
 		 * message is BAD. */
 		if(sec != sec_status_secure) {
@@ -601,7 +602,8 @@ validate_msg_signatures(struct module_qstate* qstate, struct module_env* env,
 	for(i=chase_reply->an_numrrsets; i<chase_reply->an_numrrsets+
 		chase_reply->ns_numrrsets; i++) {
 		s = chase_reply->rrsets[i];
-		sec = val_verify_rrset_entry(env, ve, s, key_entry, &reason);
+		sec = val_verify_rrset_entry(env, ve, s, key_entry, &reason,
+			LDNS_SECTION_AUTHORITY, qstate);
 		/* If anything in the authority section fails to be secure, 
 		 * we have a bad message. */
 		if(sec != sec_status_secure) {
@@ -629,7 +631,7 @@ validate_msg_signatures(struct module_qstate* qstate, struct module_env* env,
 		val_find_rrset_signer(s, &sname, &slen);
 		if(sname && query_dname_compare(sname, key_entry->name)==0)
 			(void)val_verify_rrset_entry(env, ve, s, key_entry,
-				&reason);
+				&reason, LDNS_SECTION_ADDITIONAL, qstate);
 		/* the additional section can fail to be secure, 
 		 * it is optional, check signature in case we need
 		 * to clean the additional section later. */
@@ -2484,7 +2486,7 @@ primeResponseToKE(struct ub_packed_rrset_key* dnskey_rrset,
 	/* attempt to verify with trust anchor DS and DNSKEY */
 	kkey = val_verify_new_DNSKEYs_with_ta(qstate->region, qstate->env, ve, 
 		dnskey_rrset, ta->ds_rrset, ta->dnskey_rrset, downprot,
-		&reason);
+		&reason, qstate);
 	if(!kkey) {
 		log_err("out of memory: verifying prime TA");
 		return NULL;
@@ -2574,7 +2576,7 @@ ds_response_to_ke(struct module_qstate* qstate, struct val_qstate* vq,
 		/* Verify only returns BOGUS or SECURE. If the rrset is 
 		 * bogus, then we are done. */
 		sec = val_verify_rrset_entry(qstate->env, ve, ds, 
-			vq->key_entry, &reason);
+			vq->key_entry, &reason, LDNS_SECTION_ANSWER, qstate);
 		if(sec != sec_status_secure) {
 			verbose(VERB_DETAIL, "DS rrset in DS response did "
 				"not verify");
@@ -2621,7 +2623,7 @@ ds_response_to_ke(struct module_qstate* qstate, struct val_qstate* vq,
 		/* Try to prove absence of the DS with NSEC */
 		sec = val_nsec_prove_nodata_dsreply(
 			qstate->env, ve, qinfo, msg->rep, vq->key_entry, 
-			&proof_ttl, &reason);
+			&proof_ttl, &reason, qstate);
 		switch(sec) {
 			case sec_status_secure:
 				verbose(VERB_DETAIL, "NSEC RRset for the "
@@ -2649,7 +2651,8 @@ ds_response_to_ke(struct module_qstate* qstate, struct val_qstate* vq,
 
 		sec = nsec3_prove_nods(qstate->env, ve, 
 			msg->rep->rrsets + msg->rep->an_numrrsets,
-			msg->rep->ns_numrrsets, qinfo, vq->key_entry, &reason);
+			msg->rep->ns_numrrsets, qinfo, vq->key_entry, &reason,
+			qstate);
 		switch(sec) {
 			case sec_status_insecure:
 				/* case insecure also continues to unsigned
@@ -2710,7 +2713,7 @@ ds_response_to_ke(struct module_qstate* qstate, struct val_qstate* vq,
 			goto return_bogus;
 		}
 		sec = val_verify_rrset_entry(qstate->env, ve, cname, 
-			vq->key_entry, &reason);
+			vq->key_entry, &reason, LDNS_SECTION_ANSWER, qstate);
 		if(sec == sec_status_secure) {
 			verbose(VERB_ALGO, "CNAME validated, "
 				"proof that DS does not exist");
@@ -2876,7 +2879,7 @@ process_dnskey_response(struct module_qstate* qstate, struct val_qstate* vq,
 	}
 	downprot = qstate->env->cfg->harden_algo_downgrade;
 	vq->key_entry = val_verify_new_DNSKEYs(qstate->region, qstate->env,
-		ve, dnskey, vq->ds_rrset, downprot, &reason);
+		ve, dnskey, vq->ds_rrset, downprot, &reason, qstate);
 
 	if(!vq->key_entry) {
 		log_err("out of memory in verify new DNSKEYs");
@@ -2952,7 +2955,8 @@ process_prime_response(struct module_qstate* qstate, struct val_qstate* vq,
 	}
 
 	if(ta->autr) {
-		if(!autr_process_prime(qstate->env, ve, ta, dnskey_rrset)) {
+		if(!autr_process_prime(qstate->env, ve, ta, dnskey_rrset,
+			qstate)) {
 			/* trust anchor revoked, restart with less anchors */
 			vq->state = VAL_INIT_STATE;
 			vq->trust_anchor_name = NULL;