Fix multiple OpenSSL vulnerabilities:

The receipt of a specifically crafted DTLS handshake message may cause OpenSSL
to consume large amounts of memory. [CVE-2014-3506]

The receipt of a specifically crafted DTLS packet could cause OpenSSL to leak
memory. [CVE-2014-3507]

A flaw in OBJ_obj2txt may cause pretty printing functions such as
X509_name_oneline, X509_name_print_ex et al. to leak some information from
the stack. [CVE-2014-3508]

OpenSSL DTLS clients enabling anonymous (EC)DH ciphersuites are subject to
a denial of service attack. [CVE-2014-3510]

If a multithreaded client connects to a malicious server using a resumed
session and the server sends an ec point format extension it could write
up to 255 bytes to freed memory. [CVE-2014-3509]

A flaw in the OpenSSL SSL/TLS server code causes the server to negotiate
TLS 1.0 instead of higher protocol versions when the ClientHello message
is badly fragmented. [CVE-2014-3511]

A malicious client or server can send invalid SRP parameters and overrun
an internal buffer. [CVE-2014-3512]

A malicious server can crash the client with a NULL pointer dereference by
specifying a SRP ciphersuite even though it was not properly negotiated
with the client. [CVE-2014-5139]

Security:	CVE-2014-3506, CVE-2014-3507, CVE-2014-3508, CVE-2014-3510,
		CVE-2014-3509, CVE-2014-3511, CVE-2014-3512, CVE-2014-5139
Security:	FreeBSD-SA-14:18.openssl
Approved by:	so

18 files changed, 225 insertions, 80 deletions

diff --git a/UPDATING b/UPDATING
index 2fba8ad30851..8e6f6b332219 100644
--- a/UPDATING
+++ b/UPDATING
@@ -16,6 +16,9 @@ from older versions of FreeBSD, try WITHOUT_CLANG to bootstrap to the tip of
 stable/10, and then rebuild without this option. The bootstrap process from
 older version of current is a bit fragile.
 
+20140909:	p8	FreeBSD-SA-14:18.openssl
+	Fix OpenSSL multiple vulnerabilities. [SA-14:18]
+
 20140708:	p7	FreeBSD-SA-14:17.kmem
 	Fix kernel memory disclosure in control messages and SCTP
 	notifications. [SA-14:17]
diff --git a/crypto/openssl/crypto/asn1/a_object.c b/crypto/openssl/crypto/asn1/a_object.c
index 3978c9150d8c..77b2768967e3 100644
--- a/crypto/openssl/crypto/asn1/a_object.c
+++ b/crypto/openssl/crypto/asn1/a_object.c
@@ -283,17 +283,29 @@ err:
 	ASN1err(ASN1_F_D2I_ASN1_OBJECT,i);
 	return(NULL);
 }
+
 ASN1_OBJECT *c2i_ASN1_OBJECT(ASN1_OBJECT **a, const unsigned char **pp,
 	     long len)
 	{
 	ASN1_OBJECT *ret=NULL;
 	const unsigned char *p;
 	unsigned char *data;
-	int i;
-	/* Sanity check OID encoding: can't have leading 0x80 in
-	 * subidentifiers, see: X.690 8.19.2
+	int i, length;
+
+	/* Sanity check OID encoding.
+	 * Need at least one content octet.
+	 * MSB must be clear in the last octet.
+	 * can't have leading 0x80 in subidentifiers, see: X.690 8.19.2
 	 */
-	for (i = 0, p = *pp; i < len; i++, p++)
+	if (len <= 0 || len > INT_MAX || pp == NULL || (p = *pp) == NULL ||
+	    p[len - 1] & 0x80)
+		{
+		ASN1err(ASN1_F_C2I_ASN1_OBJECT,ASN1_R_INVALID_OBJECT_ENCODING);
+		return NULL;
+		}
+	/* Now 0 < len <= INT_MAX, so the cast is safe. */
+	length = (int)len;
+	for (i = 0; i < length; i++, p++)
 		{
 		if (*p == 0x80 && (!i || !(p[-1] & 0x80)))
 			{
@@ -316,23 +328,23 @@ ASN1_OBJECT *c2i_ASN1_OBJECT(ASN1_OBJECT **a, const unsigned char **pp,
 	data = (unsigned char *)ret->data;
 	ret->data = NULL;
 	/* once detached we can change it */
-	if ((data == NULL) || (ret->length < len))
+	if ((data == NULL) || (ret->length < length))
 		{
 		ret->length=0;
 		if (data != NULL) OPENSSL_free(data);
-		data=(unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(len ? (int)len : 1);
+		data=(unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(length);
 		if (data == NULL)
 			{ i=ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE; goto err; }
 		ret->flags|=ASN1_OBJECT_FLAG_DYNAMIC_DATA;
 		}
-	memcpy(data,p,(int)len);
+	memcpy(data,p,length);
 	/* reattach data to object, after which it remains const */
 	ret->data  =data;
-	ret->length=(int)len;
+	ret->length=length;
 	ret->sn=NULL;
 	ret->ln=NULL;
 	/* ret->flags=ASN1_OBJECT_FLAG_DYNAMIC; we know it is dynamic */
-	p+=len;
+	p+=length;
 
 	if (a != NULL) (*a)=ret;
 	*pp=p;
diff --git a/crypto/openssl/crypto/objects/obj_dat.c b/crypto/openssl/crypto/objects/obj_dat.c
index 8a342ba3eb3e..0b2f44241b54 100644
--- a/crypto/openssl/crypto/objects/obj_dat.c
+++ b/crypto/openssl/crypto/objects/obj_dat.c
@@ -471,11 +471,12 @@ int OBJ_obj2txt(char *buf, int buf_len, const ASN1_OBJECT *a, int no_name)
 	const unsigned char *p;
 	char tbuf[DECIMAL_SIZE(i)+DECIMAL_SIZE(l)+2];
 
-	if ((a == NULL) || (a->data == NULL)) {
-		buf[0]='\0';
-		return(0);
-	}
+	/* Ensure that, at every state, |buf| is NUL-terminated. */
+	if (buf && buf_len > 0)
+		buf[0] = '\0';
 
+	if ((a == NULL) || (a->data == NULL))
+		return(0);
 
 	if (!no_name && (nid=OBJ_obj2nid(a)) != NID_undef)
 		{
@@ -554,9 +555,10 @@ int OBJ_obj2txt(char *buf, int buf_len, const ASN1_OBJECT *a, int no_name)
 				i=(int)(l/40);
 				l-=(long)(i*40);
 				}
-			if (buf && (buf_len > 0))
+			if (buf && (buf_len > 1))
 				{
 				*buf++ = i + '0';
+				*buf = '\0';
 				buf_len--;
 				}
 			n++;
@@ -571,9 +573,10 @@ int OBJ_obj2txt(char *buf, int buf_len, const ASN1_OBJECT *a, int no_name)
 			i = strlen(bndec);
 			if (buf)
 				{
-				if (buf_len > 0)
+				if (buf_len > 1)
 					{
 					*buf++ = '.';
+					*buf = '\0';
 					buf_len--;
 					}
 				BUF_strlcpy(buf,bndec,buf_len);
@@ -807,4 +810,3 @@ err:
 	OPENSSL_free(buf);
 	return(ok);
 	}
-
diff --git a/crypto/openssl/crypto/srp/srp_lib.c b/crypto/openssl/crypto/srp/srp_lib.c
index 92cea98dcd6a..f8369aa9f48b 100644
--- a/crypto/openssl/crypto/srp/srp_lib.c
+++ b/crypto/openssl/crypto/srp/srp_lib.c
@@ -85,6 +85,9 @@ static BIGNUM *srp_Calc_k(BIGNUM *N, BIGNUM *g)
 	int longg ;
 	int longN = BN_num_bytes(N);
 
+	if (BN_ucmp(g, N) >= 0)
+		return NULL;
+
 	if ((tmp = OPENSSL_malloc(longN)) == NULL)
 		return NULL;
 	BN_bn2bin(N,tmp) ;
@@ -117,6 +120,9 @@ BIGNUM *SRP_Calc_u(BIGNUM *A, BIGNUM *B, BIGNUM *N)
 	if ((A == NULL) ||(B == NULL) || (N == NULL))
 		return NULL;
 
+	if (BN_ucmp(A, N) >= 0 || BN_ucmp(B, N) >= 0)
+		return NULL;
+
 	longN= BN_num_bytes(N);
 
 	if ((cAB = OPENSSL_malloc(2*longN)) == NULL) 
diff --git a/crypto/openssl/ssl/d1_both.c b/crypto/openssl/ssl/d1_both.c
index f5d756cf1259..bf40ccbeabc5 100644
--- a/crypto/openssl/ssl/d1_both.c
+++ b/crypto/openssl/ssl/d1_both.c
@@ -586,29 +586,32 @@ dtls1_retrieve_buffered_fragment(SSL *s, long max, int *ok)
 		return 0;
 	}
 
+/* dtls1_max_handshake_message_len returns the maximum number of bytes
+ * permitted in a DTLS handshake message for |s|. The minimum is 16KB, but may
+ * be greater if the maximum certificate list size requires it. */
+static unsigned long dtls1_max_handshake_message_len(const SSL *s)
+	{
+	unsigned long max_len = DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH;
+	if (max_len < (unsigned long)s->max_cert_list)
+		return s->max_cert_list;
+	return max_len;
+	}
 
 static int
-dtls1_reassemble_fragment(SSL *s, struct hm_header_st* msg_hdr, int *ok)
+dtls1_reassemble_fragment(SSL *s, const struct hm_header_st* msg_hdr, int *ok)
 	{
 	hm_fragment *frag = NULL;
 	pitem *item = NULL;
 	int i = -1, is_complete;
 	unsigned char seq64be[8];
-	unsigned long frag_len = msg_hdr->frag_len, max_len;
+	unsigned long frag_len = msg_hdr->frag_len;
 
-	if ((msg_hdr->frag_off+frag_len) > msg_hdr->msg_len)
+	if ((msg_hdr->frag_off+frag_len) > msg_hdr->msg_len ||
+	    msg_hdr->msg_len > dtls1_max_handshake_message_len(s))
 		goto err;
 
-	/* Determine maximum allowed message size. Depends on (user set)
-	 * maximum certificate length, but 16k is minimum.
-	 */
-	if (DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH < s->max_cert_list)
-		max_len = s->max_cert_list;
-	else
-		max_len = DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH;
-
-	if ((msg_hdr->frag_off+frag_len) > max_len)
-		goto err;
+	if (frag_len == 0)
+		return DTLS1_HM_FRAGMENT_RETRY;
 
 	/* Try to find item in queue */
 	memset(seq64be,0,sizeof(seq64be));
@@ -638,7 +641,8 @@ dtls1_reassemble_fragment(SSL *s, struct hm_header_st* msg_hdr, int *ok)
 
 
 	/* If message is already reassembled, this must be a
-	 * retransmit and can be dropped.
+	 * retransmit and can be dropped. In this case item != NULL and so frag
+	 * does not need to be freed.
 	 */
 	if (frag->reassembly == NULL)
 		{
@@ -658,7 +662,9 @@ dtls1_reassemble_fragment(SSL *s, struct hm_header_st* msg_hdr, int *ok)
 	/* read the body of the fragment (header has already been read */
 	i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
 		frag->fragment + msg_hdr->frag_off,frag_len,0);
-	if (i<=0 || (unsigned long)i!=frag_len)
+	if ((unsigned long)i!=frag_len)
+		i=-1;
+	if (i<=0)
 		goto err;
 
 	RSMBLY_BITMASK_MARK(frag->reassembly, (long)msg_hdr->frag_off,
@@ -675,10 +681,6 @@ dtls1_reassemble_fragment(SSL *s, struct hm_header_st* msg_hdr, int *ok)
 
 	if (item == NULL)
 		{
-		memset(seq64be,0,sizeof(seq64be));
-		seq64be[6] = (unsigned char)(msg_hdr->seq>>8);
-		seq64be[7] = (unsigned char)(msg_hdr->seq);
-
 		item = pitem_new(seq64be, frag);
 		if (item == NULL)
 			{
@@ -686,21 +688,25 @@ dtls1_reassemble_fragment(SSL *s, struct hm_header_st* msg_hdr, int *ok)
 			i = -1;
 			}
 
-		pqueue_insert(s->d1->buffered_messages, item);
+		item = pqueue_insert(s->d1->buffered_messages, item);
+		/* pqueue_insert fails iff a duplicate item is inserted.
+		 * However, |item| cannot be a duplicate. If it were,
+		 * |pqueue_find|, above, would have returned it and control
+		 * would never have reached this branch. */
+		OPENSSL_assert(item != NULL);
 		}
 
 	return DTLS1_HM_FRAGMENT_RETRY;
 
 err:
-	if (frag != NULL) dtls1_hm_fragment_free(frag);
-	if (item != NULL) OPENSSL_free(item);
+	if (frag != NULL && item == NULL) dtls1_hm_fragment_free(frag);
 	*ok = 0;
 	return i;
 	}
 
 
 static int
-dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message(SSL *s, struct hm_header_st* msg_hdr, int *ok)
+dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message(SSL *s, const struct hm_header_st* msg_hdr, int *ok)
 {
 	int i=-1;
 	hm_fragment *frag = NULL;
@@ -720,7 +726,7 @@ dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message(SSL *s, struct hm_header_st* msg_hdr, int *ok)
 	/* If we already have an entry and this one is a fragment,
 	 * don't discard it and rather try to reassemble it.
 	 */
-	if (item != NULL && frag_len < msg_hdr->msg_len)
+	if (item != NULL && frag_len != msg_hdr->msg_len)
 		item = NULL;
 
 	/* Discard the message if sequence number was already there, is
@@ -745,9 +751,12 @@ dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message(SSL *s, struct hm_header_st* msg_hdr, int *ok)
 		}
 	else
 		{
-		if (frag_len && frag_len < msg_hdr->msg_len)
+		if (frag_len != msg_hdr->msg_len)
 			return dtls1_reassemble_fragment(s, msg_hdr, ok);
 
+		if (frag_len > dtls1_max_handshake_message_len(s))
+			goto err;
+
 		frag = dtls1_hm_fragment_new(frag_len, 0);
 		if ( frag == NULL)
 			goto err;
@@ -759,26 +768,31 @@ dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message(SSL *s, struct hm_header_st* msg_hdr, int *ok)
 			/* read the body of the fragment (header has already been read */
 			i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
 				frag->fragment,frag_len,0);
-			if (i<=0 || (unsigned long)i!=frag_len)
+			if ((unsigned long)i!=frag_len)
+				i = -1;
+			if (i<=0)
 				goto err;
 			}
 
-		memset(seq64be,0,sizeof(seq64be));
-		seq64be[6] = (unsigned char)(msg_hdr->seq>>8);
-		seq64be[7] = (unsigned char)(msg_hdr->seq);
-
 		item = pitem_new(seq64be, frag);
 		if ( item == NULL)
 			goto err;
 
-		pqueue_insert(s->d1->buffered_messages, item);
+		item = pqueue_insert(s->d1->buffered_messages, item);
+		/* pqueue_insert fails iff a duplicate item is inserted.
+		 * However, |item| cannot be a duplicate. If it were,
+		 * |pqueue_find|, above, would have returned it. Then, either
+		 * |frag_len| != |msg_hdr->msg_len| in which case |item| is set
+		 * to NULL and it will have been processed with
+		 * |dtls1_reassemble_fragment|, above, or the record will have
+		 * been discarded. */
+		OPENSSL_assert(item != NULL);
 		}
 
 	return DTLS1_HM_FRAGMENT_RETRY;
 
 err:
-	if ( frag != NULL) dtls1_hm_fragment_free(frag);
-	if ( item != NULL) OPENSSL_free(item);
+	if (frag != NULL && item == NULL) dtls1_hm_fragment_free(frag);
 	*ok = 0;
 	return i;
 	}
diff --git a/crypto/openssl/ssl/d1_clnt.c b/crypto/openssl/ssl/d1_clnt.c
index a6ed09c51dda..6493796ad13b 100644
--- a/crypto/openssl/ssl/d1_clnt.c
+++ b/crypto/openssl/ssl/d1_clnt.c
@@ -982,6 +982,13 @@ int dtls1_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
 			RSA *rsa;
 			unsigned char tmp_buf[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
 
+			if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
+				{
+				/* We should always have a server certificate with SSL_kRSA. */
+				SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+				goto err;
+				}
+
 			if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp != NULL)
 				rsa=s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp;
 			else
@@ -1172,6 +1179,13 @@ int dtls1_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
 			{
 			DH *dh_srvr,*dh_clnt;
 
+			if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
+				{
+				ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+				SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+				goto err;
+				}
+
 			if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp != NULL)
 				dh_srvr=s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp;
 			else
@@ -1231,6 +1245,13 @@ int dtls1_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
 			int ecdh_clnt_cert = 0;
 			int field_size = 0;
 
+			if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
+				{
+				ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+				SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+				goto err;
+				}
+
 			/* Did we send out the client's
 			 * ECDH share for use in premaster
 			 * computation as part of client certificate?
@@ -1706,5 +1727,3 @@ int dtls1_send_client_certificate(SSL *s)
 	/* SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D */
 	return(dtls1_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
 	}
-
-
diff --git a/crypto/openssl/ssl/s23_srvr.c b/crypto/openssl/ssl/s23_srvr.c
index 48778490135e..2901a6bd0104 100644
--- a/crypto/openssl/ssl/s23_srvr.c
+++ b/crypto/openssl/ssl/s23_srvr.c
@@ -348,23 +348,19 @@ int ssl23_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
 			 * Client Hello message, this would be difficult, and we'd have
 			 * to read more records to find out.
 			 * No known SSL 3.0 client fragments ClientHello like this,
-			 * so we simply assume TLS 1.0 to avoid protocol version downgrade
-			 * attacks. */
+			 * so we simply reject such connections to avoid
+			 * protocol version downgrade attacks. */
 			if (p[3] == 0 && p[4] < 6)
 				{
-#if 0
 				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_SMALL);
 				goto err;
-#else
-				v[1] = TLS1_VERSION_MINOR;
-#endif
 				}
 			/* if major version number > 3 set minor to a value
 			 * which will use the highest version 3 we support.
 			 * If TLS 2.0 ever appears we will need to revise
 			 * this....
 			 */
-			else if (p[9] > SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR)
+			if (p[9] > SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR)
 				v[1]=0xff;
 			else
 				v[1]=p[10]; /* minor version according to client_version */
@@ -444,14 +440,34 @@ int ssl23_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
 		v[0] = p[3]; /* == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR */
 		v[1] = p[4];
 
+		/* An SSLv3/TLSv1 backwards-compatible CLIENT-HELLO in an SSLv2
+		 * header is sent directly on the wire, not wrapped as a TLS
+		 * record. It's format is:
+		 * Byte  Content
+		 * 0-1   msg_length
+		 * 2     msg_type
+		 * 3-4   version
+		 * 5-6   cipher_spec_length
+		 * 7-8   session_id_length
+		 * 9-10  challenge_length
+		 * ...   ...
+		 */
 		n=((p[0]&0x7f)<<8)|p[1];
 		if (n > (1024*4))
 			{
 			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_LARGE);
 			goto err;
 			}
+		if (n < 9)
+			{
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+			goto err;
+			}
 
 		j=ssl23_read_bytes(s,n+2);
+		/* We previously read 11 bytes, so if j > 0, we must have
+		 * j == n+2 == s->packet_length. We have at least 11 valid
+		 * packet bytes. */
 		if (j <= 0) return(j);
 
 		ssl3_finish_mac(s, s->packet+2, s->packet_length-2);
diff --git a/crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_clnt.c b/crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_clnt.c
index 4fcd72e3b282..e133a7cc2bcd 100644
--- a/crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_clnt.c
+++ b/crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_clnt.c
@@ -953,6 +953,15 @@ int ssl3_get_server_hello(SSL *s)
 		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
 		goto f_err;
 		}
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+	if (((c->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) || (c->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSRP)) &&
+		    !(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP))
+		{
+		al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
+		goto f_err;
+		}
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
 	p+=ssl_put_cipher_by_char(s,NULL,NULL);
 
 	sk=ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(s);
@@ -1459,6 +1468,12 @@ int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s)
 		p+=i;
 		n-=param_len;
 
+		if (!srp_verify_server_param(s, &al))
+			{
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS);
+			goto f_err;
+			}
+
 /* We must check if there is a certificate */
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
 		if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA)
@@ -2252,6 +2267,13 @@ int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
 			RSA *rsa;
 			unsigned char tmp_buf[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
 
+			if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
+				{
+				/* We should always have a server certificate with SSL_kRSA. */
+				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+				goto err;
+				}
+
 			if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp != NULL)
 				rsa=s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp;
 			else
diff --git a/crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_lib.c b/crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_lib.c
index 3291e3d8e297..ceb117cd7280 100644
--- a/crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_lib.c
+++ b/crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_lib.c
@@ -2426,7 +2426,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[]={
 	TLS1_TXT_SRP_SHA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
 	TLS1_CK_SRP_SHA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
 	SSL_kSRP,
-	SSL_aNULL,
+	SSL_aSRP,
 	SSL_3DES,
 	SSL_SHA1,
 	SSL_TLSV1,
@@ -2474,7 +2474,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[]={
 	TLS1_TXT_SRP_SHA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
 	TLS1_CK_SRP_SHA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
 	SSL_kSRP,
-	SSL_aNULL,
+	SSL_aSRP,
 	SSL_AES128,
 	SSL_SHA1,
 	SSL_TLSV1,
@@ -2522,7 +2522,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[]={
 	TLS1_TXT_SRP_SHA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
 	TLS1_CK_SRP_SHA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
 	SSL_kSRP,
-	SSL_aNULL,
+	SSL_aSRP,
 	SSL_AES256,
 	SSL_SHA1,
 	SSL_TLSV1,
diff --git a/crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_srvr.c b/crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_srvr.c
index 8b13357d79c2..694b8e12df73 100644
--- a/crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_srvr.c
+++ b/crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_srvr.c
@@ -2798,6 +2798,13 @@ int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
 				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
 				goto err;
 				}
+			if (BN_ucmp(s->srp_ctx.A, s->srp_ctx.N) >= 0
+				|| BN_is_zero(s->srp_ctx.A))
+				{
+				al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS);
+				goto f_err;
+				}
 			if (s->session->srp_username != NULL)
 				OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
 			s->session->srp_username = BUF_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
diff --git a/crypto/openssl/ssl/ssl.h b/crypto/openssl/ssl/ssl.h
index 593579ed3670..43fa30d24d2e 100644
--- a/crypto/openssl/ssl/ssl.h
+++ b/crypto/openssl/ssl/ssl.h
@@ -264,6 +264,7 @@ extern "C" {
 #define SSL_TXT_aGOST94	"aGOST94"
 #define SSL_TXT_aGOST01 "aGOST01"
 #define SSL_TXT_aGOST  "aGOST"
+#define SSL_TXT_aSRP            "aSRP"
 
 #define	SSL_TXT_DSS		"DSS"
 #define SSL_TXT_DH		"DH"
@@ -2309,6 +2310,7 @@ void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void);
 #define SSL_R_BAD_SRP_B_LENGTH				 348
 #define SSL_R_BAD_SRP_G_LENGTH				 349
 #define SSL_R_BAD_SRP_N_LENGTH				 350
+#define SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS			 371
 #define SSL_R_BAD_SRP_S_LENGTH				 351
 #define SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_MKI_VALUE			 352
 #define SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST		 353
diff --git a/crypto/openssl/ssl/ssl_ciph.c b/crypto/openssl/ssl/ssl_ciph.c
index 0aba8e048c58..06da26acc587 100644
--- a/crypto/openssl/ssl/ssl_ciph.c
+++ b/crypto/openssl/ssl/ssl_ciph.c
@@ -270,6 +270,7 @@ static const SSL_CIPHER cipher_aliases[]={
 	{0,SSL_TXT_aGOST94,0,0,SSL_aGOST94,0,0,0,0,0,0,0},
 	{0,SSL_TXT_aGOST01,0,0,SSL_aGOST01,0,0,0,0,0,0,0},
 	{0,SSL_TXT_aGOST,0,0,SSL_aGOST94|SSL_aGOST01,0,0,0,0,0,0,0},
+	{0,SSL_TXT_aSRP,0,    0,SSL_aSRP,  0,0,0,0,0,0,0},
 
 	/* aliases combining key exchange and server authentication */
 	{0,SSL_TXT_EDH,0,     SSL_kEDH,~SSL_aNULL,0,0,0,0,0,0,0},
@@ -1628,6 +1629,9 @@ char *SSL_CIPHER_description(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher, char *buf, int len)
 	case SSL_aPSK:
 		au="PSK";
 		break;
+	case SSL_aSRP:
+		au="SRP";
+		break;
 	default:
 		au="unknown";
 		break;
diff --git a/crypto/openssl/ssl/ssl_err.c b/crypto/openssl/ssl/ssl_err.c
index 370fb57e3b86..73a3a1798ccc 100644
--- a/crypto/openssl/ssl/ssl_err.c
+++ b/crypto/openssl/ssl/ssl_err.c
@@ -329,6 +329,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA SSL_str_reasons[]=
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_SRP_B_LENGTH)      ,"bad srp b length"},
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_SRP_G_LENGTH)      ,"bad srp g length"},
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_SRP_N_LENGTH)      ,"bad srp n length"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS)    ,"bad srp parameters"},
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_SRP_S_LENGTH)      ,"bad srp s length"},
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_MKI_VALUE)    ,"bad srtp mki value"},
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST),"bad srtp protection profile list"},
diff --git a/crypto/openssl/ssl/ssl_lib.c b/crypto/openssl/ssl/ssl_lib.c
index 14d143da0441..678fb13b92bc 100644
--- a/crypto/openssl/ssl/ssl_lib.c
+++ b/crypto/openssl/ssl/ssl_lib.c
@@ -1402,6 +1402,11 @@ int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s,STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk,unsigned char *p,
 		    s->psk_client_callback == NULL)
 			continue;
 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+		if (((c->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) || (c->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSRP)) &&
+		    !(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP))
+		    continue;
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
 		j = put_cb ? put_cb(c,p) : ssl_put_cipher_by_char(s,c,p);
 		p+=j;
 		}
diff --git a/crypto/openssl/ssl/ssl_locl.h b/crypto/openssl/ssl/ssl_locl.h
index ada800854953..741797ea92f1 100644
--- a/crypto/openssl/ssl/ssl_locl.h
+++ b/crypto/openssl/ssl/ssl_locl.h
@@ -311,6 +311,7 @@
 #define SSL_aPSK                0x00000080L /* PSK auth */
 #define SSL_aGOST94				0x00000100L /* GOST R 34.10-94 signature auth */
 #define SSL_aGOST01 			0x00000200L /* GOST R 34.10-2001 signature auth */
+#define SSL_aSRP 		0x00000400L /* SRP auth */
 
 
 /* Bits for algorithm_enc (symmetric encryption) */
@@ -1173,4 +1174,6 @@ void tls_fips_digest_extra(
 	const EVP_CIPHER_CTX *cipher_ctx, EVP_MD_CTX *mac_ctx,
 	const unsigned char *data, size_t data_len, size_t orig_len);
 
+int srp_verify_server_param(SSL *s, int *al);
+
 #endif
diff --git a/crypto/openssl/ssl/t1_lib.c b/crypto/openssl/ssl/t1_lib.c
index 0160726a42c1..9edd0b821b2e 100644
--- a/crypto/openssl/ssl/t1_lib.c
+++ b/crypto/openssl/ssl/t1_lib.c
@@ -1446,15 +1446,18 @@ int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, in
 				*al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
 				return 0;
 				}
-			s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
-			if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
-			if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
+			if (!s->hit)
 				{
-				*al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
-				return 0;
+				s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
+				if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
+				if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
+					{
+					*al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+					return 0;
+					}
+				s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
+				memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
 				}
-			s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
-			memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
 #if 0
 			fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist ");
 			sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
diff --git a/crypto/openssl/ssl/tls_srp.c b/crypto/openssl/ssl/tls_srp.c
index 2315a7c0a2e9..e7368a8f6bc2 100644
--- a/crypto/openssl/ssl/tls_srp.c
+++ b/crypto/openssl/ssl/tls_srp.c
@@ -408,16 +408,46 @@ err:
 	return ret;
 	}
 
-int SRP_Calc_A_param(SSL *s)
+int srp_verify_server_param(SSL *s, int *al)
 	{
-	unsigned char rnd[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
+	SRP_CTX *srp = &s->srp_ctx;
+	/* Sanity check parameters: we can quickly check B % N == 0
+	 * by checking B != 0 since B < N
+	 */
+	if (BN_ucmp(srp->g, srp->N) >=0 || BN_ucmp(srp->B, srp->N) >= 0
+		|| BN_is_zero(srp->B))
+		{
+		*al = SSL3_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+		return 0;
+		}
 
-	if (BN_num_bits(s->srp_ctx.N) < s->srp_ctx.strength)
-		return -1;
+	if (BN_num_bits(srp->N) < srp->strength)
+		{
+		*al = TLS1_AD_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY;
+		return 0;
+		}
 
-	if (s->srp_ctx.SRP_verify_param_callback ==NULL && 
-		!SRP_check_known_gN_param(s->srp_ctx.g,s->srp_ctx.N))
-		return -1 ;
+	if (srp->SRP_verify_param_callback)
+		{
+		if (srp->SRP_verify_param_callback(s, srp->SRP_cb_arg) <= 0)
+			{
+			*al = TLS1_AD_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY;
+			return 0;
+			}
+		}
+	else if(!SRP_check_known_gN_param(srp->g, srp->N))
+		{
+		*al = TLS1_AD_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY;
+		return 0;
+		}
+
+	return 1;
+	}
+	
+
+int SRP_Calc_A_param(SSL *s)
+	{
+	unsigned char rnd[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
 
 	RAND_bytes(rnd, sizeof(rnd));
 	s->srp_ctx.a = BN_bin2bn(rnd, sizeof(rnd), s->srp_ctx.a);
@@ -426,10 +456,6 @@ int SRP_Calc_A_param(SSL *s)
 	if (!(s->srp_ctx.A = SRP_Calc_A(s->srp_ctx.a,s->srp_ctx.N,s->srp_ctx.g)))
 		return -1;
 
-	/* We can have a callback to verify SRP param!! */
-	if (s->srp_ctx.SRP_verify_param_callback !=NULL) 
-		return s->srp_ctx.SRP_verify_param_callback(s,s->srp_ctx.SRP_cb_arg);
-
 	return 1;
 	}
 
diff --git a/sys/conf/newvers.sh b/sys/conf/newvers.sh
index 658de220fe4f..8674d80d2935 100644
--- a/sys/conf/newvers.sh
+++ b/sys/conf/newvers.sh
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@
 
 TYPE="FreeBSD"
 REVISION="10.0"
-BRANCH="RELEASE-p7"
+BRANCH="RELEASE-p8"
 if [ "X${BRANCH_OVERRIDE}" != "X" ]; then
 	BRANCH=${BRANCH_OVERRIDE}
 fi